Navigating Complex Waters: Russia's Soft Power Assets in Türkiye
Investigators/Authors: Ata Ahmet Kökçü
Authors: Ata Ahmet Kökçü, Christian Mamo and Lucas Tonks
Edited by: Orlaith Delaney
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Türkiye has manoeuvred itself into being an important conduit between the warring parties. Taking advantage of its unique geopolitical circumstances, Türkiye is in a position where it can exert a significant amount of influence on both Russia and Ukraine. Early in the war, two rounds of peace talks between Russia and Ukraine were held in Antalya, with Turkish diplomats acting as mediators. Türkiye hosted Ukrainian prisoners of war captured in the Siege of Mariupol, who were later repatriated to Ukraine far ahead of schedule. Furthermore, Türkiye has functioned as a crucial guarantor of Ukrainian grain exports.
However, Türkiye`s government still displays much ambiguity in its orientation. Notwithstanding substantial defence sector cooperation between Türkiye and Ukraine that predates the Russian invasion—Ukraine fields dozens of Bayraktar TB2 drones and Türkiye’s Akinci drone uses a Ukrainian-made engine—Türkiye’s relations with Russia appear somewhat intact. Russians are still the biggest tourist demographic in Türkiye, bringing in crucial revenue. Russia is also among Türkiye’s biggest suppliers of natural gas, enabling the Russian state to wield a degree of influence over Türkiye.
As such, Russia and Türkiye have little choice but to cooperate. With Türkiye occupying such a crucial juncture between Europe and Asia, the two nations` prospects are to a degree intertwined. And the Russian state appears to be fully aware of the importance of maintaining at least civil relations with its longtime geopolitical rival. Two ostensibly neutral Ankara-based institutions—the Russian House and the Institute of Russian Studies (RUSEN)—play an important role in realising this goal. The rhetoric deployed by both institutions can provide a glimpse of how such state-affiliated institutions promote Russian influence by tailoring their narratives to the sensitivities of their domestic audience.
Russian-Turkish Relations
Russia and Türkiye have a long and complex relationship, marked by a blend of cooperation and competition, and shaped by historical legacies, strategic interests and regional dynamics. During the two nations' heydays as major powers, Tsarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire fought more than a dozen wars over the centuries, with Ottoman control over the Bosphorus providing a major geopolitical conundrum for successive Russian tsars. During the Cold War, Türkiye became one of the most important North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states, forming the backbone of the alliance’s strategy in the Black Sea region.
Following the fall of the Soviet Union, with the newly-formed Russian middle classes increasingly flocking to the beaches of southern Türkiye, the two states began forming substantial economic ties. In late 2005, Blue Stream, a gas pipeline going directly from Russia to Türkiye was commissioned, with a second pipeline, TurkStream, opened in 2020. In the mid-2010s, Türkiye also incurred significant opprobrium from its NATO allies over its plans to purchase the Russian S400 air defence system, underlining Türkiye’s increasingly independent foreign policy.
Despite these instances of cooperation and collaboration, Russia and Türkiye have also found themselves at odds in multiple geopolitical flashpoints. In 2015, Russia launched a large-scale intervention in Syria in support of the government of Bashar al-Assad, multiple times coming close to direct conflict with Türkiye. Shortly after the beginning of the intervention, Türkiye shot down a Russian fighter plane that had crossed the Syrian border into Turkish territory. In early 2020, the governments of Türkiye and Syria even fought a brief war, spurred by a deadly air strike on Turkish soldiers in Syria, allegedly conducted by Russian warplanes.
Furthermore, in Libya, Russia deployed Wagner in support of ex-Libyan general Khalifa Haftar’s forces. There, they battled the internationally recognized Libyan government, which received significant support from Türkiye. In these complex circumstances, there may have even been direct confrontations between Wagner troops and Turkish soldiers.
However, despite these tensions—and sometimes outright conflicts—Russia and Türkiye continue to maintain outwardly civil relations, highlighting the level of interdependence between the two states. In recognition of the significance of Türkiye to its geopolitical goals, some Russian state-affiliated institutions promote Russian soft power as a means of building a positive foundation for bilateral relations between the two countries. One of these is the state agency Rossotrudnichestvo-run Russian House in Ankara.
Russian House
Like many other states, Russia maintains a network of cultural centres around the world as a means of promoting a positive image of the country, all coordinated by the Rossotrudnichestvo. However, what sets Russia’s apart from others is the degree of politicisation of these institutions’ activities. The Russian House in Berlin, for example, regularly hosts events for far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD)-affiliated media organisations and maintains ties with Russian nationalist civil society organisations thatare in direct contact with Russian proxies in Ukraine. Last year, the Russian House in Prague found itself featured in European media over accusations of its director being closely-affiliated with Russian intelligence. And in the Central African Republic, the director of Bangui’s Russian House, Dmitry Sytyi, was named by The Wall Street Journal as being the man running Wagner’s resource extraction empire in Africa.
With the Russian House in Ankara, the footprint of the Russian state and its affiliated intelligence agencies is much less apparent. The Ankara institute doesn’t seem to be engaged in local politics the way Berlin’s is, nor are there known ex-military intelligence servicemen constantly milling about the premises. The bulk of its programme seems to consist of cultural events—orchestral performances, film screenings, language lessons—hardly anything objectionable. However, the public statements of its staff—particularly the director, Aleksandr Sotnichenko—reveal much about the Russian state’s strategy of soft power.
Sotnichenko has an academic background, having been a lecturer at the faculty of international relations at St Petersburg State University. There, he specialised in Middle Eastern politics, Turkish history and Turkish-Russian relations. Such a background familiarises him with his audience in Türkiye, making him ideal for the task of promoting a positive image of Russia in the country. The rhetoric deployed by Sotnichenko in his Turkish media appearances underline this.
For example, speaking with think tank TURKSAM, a particularly revealing quote from Sotnichenko highlighted supposed commonalities between Russia and Türkiye:
‘Europe's perception of Russia and Turkey is similar. Europe considers these two civilizations to be barbaric. These two countries, which have a common civilization, are excluded. It is very clear that Europe considers these two civilizations to be alien. In fact, it does not seem possible for Turkey to become a member of the EU process. The reason for this is not economic conditions, but civilizational differences. Russia and Turkey will never be European…we are not only friends, but also brothers.’
Here, Sotnichenko’s rhetoric fits nicely with one of the Russian state’s main rhetorical techniques. Following the invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent breakdown in diplomatic and economic relations with much of the western world, the Russian state began to put more emphasis on its messaging targeting the non-western world. A cornerstone of this messaging relies on invoking the widespread resentment in the so-called ‘global south’ against the United States and the old colonial powers of western Europe, by portraying Russia as another victim of the west’s chauvinism, imperialism and racism. This is a sharp departure from the historical Russian state’s well-documented centuries-long arduous efforts to validate itself as a fellow European power. Nevertheless, it has proved to be a powerful tool in cementing in people’s minds the misleading image of Russia as a bulwark against western imperialism.
In this quote, Sotnichenko also makes sure to mention Türkiye’s flagging European Union (EU) membership bids. The glacial, sometimes stationary, pace of Türkiye’s European integration efforts have been the source of widespread frustration among the Turkish public, with the EU accused of unfairly leading on successive Turkish governments. Here, Sotnichenko displays a keen understanding of the moods in Türkiye on the matter, invoking a sensitive matter as a means of drawing commonalities between Russia and Türkiye.
Other statements from Sotnichenko show as much perceptiveness. He posts pictures of himself reading pro-government, conservative Turkish newspapers like Yeni Akit. He heaps praise upon Turkish national heroes such as Atatürk, even stating that the founder of the modern Turkish state ‘left a will to the Turkish people so they do not forget the close friendship and brotherhood established with Russia’. And he criticises countries which are known to be unpopular in Türkiye, like Armenia. In an interview with Turkish daily Milliyet, he appears to downplay the Armenian genocide by stating that ‘other peoples in the Caucasus have their own genocide theories’ and that ‘genocide theories only bring a fight for the future’.
The latter statements in particular illustrate a degree of flexibility in the Russian state’s messaging. While keeping with the overall ‘anti-western’ image espoused by Russia, Sotnichenko demonstrates his ability to tailor the Russian state’s narratives to domestic audiences. As such, he appears to be succeeding in his role as director of the Russian House - not only is the institution putting on events promoting Russian language, culture and history, the director himself is actively promoting messaging thatdraws Russia and Türkiye together.
RUSEN
Beyond openly state-run institutions, ostensibly private enterprises also appear to play a similar function in promoting Russian soft power. One of these is the Ankara Institute of Russian Studies - better known by its Turkish language abbreviation RUSEN. On its website, RUSEN has the stated goal of ‘increasing inter-communal interaction, sensitivity, and solidarity in the Eurasian geography, which has hosted the ancient cultures and civilizations of human history, especially in Russia’ (our translation). While the institute’s founding predates Russia’s pivot to championing its ‘Eurasian’ values, it still functions as an important arm of Russian soft power in Türkiye.
The institute maintains a fairly active Twitter/X account with well over 100,000 followers. However, this account seems to be primarily used to spread narratives friendly to both the Russian state and the Turkish public. This includes championing causes popular with the Turkish public—like the Palestinian cause, as seen above—as well as sending sly digs at rivals of the Turkish state, like Greece and the various Kurdish militias, and attempting to connect these to Ukraine.
In the tweet below, RUSEN subtly reminds its audience that Greece supports Ukraine in a way Turkey doesn’t. It also plays on Turkish nationalist sentiments by implying that the US fears asking Turkey to do the same.
In the below tweet from April 2019, RUSEN reminds its audience that the Patriot missile system given to Ukraine was not given to Turkey, an actual NATO member. There is no mention of the fact that it was the Turkish government which rejected the acquisition of Patriot missiles in favour of the Russian S400, due to Russia also offering a technology transfer.
The potential impact on its reputation as a trustworthy research centre doesn’t dissuade RUSEN from publishing blatantly propagandistic material either. In the below tweet dated to July 2022, the institute repeats Russian military claims about armed Gülenists fighting for Ukraine. Predictably, Greece is also mentioned.
The various Kurdish nationalist militias which the Turkish state has been combatting also feature prominently in RUSEN’s statements. In the tweet below, RUSEN brings up how the United States is stepping up patrols with the PYD, a Kurdish nationalist group in northern Syria with ties to the PKK.
However, what this tweet, and others on the PYD do not mention is that Russia also maintains ties with these groups, and also conducts joint patrols with them. As this is in an inconvenient fact in RUSEN’s narrative of Russia being a natural ally to Türkiye, RUSEN emphasises the United State’s ties with these groups, even suggesting that the US is deliberately provoking Türkiye.
Both the Russian House, with Sotnichenko as its head, and RUSEN appear to have the same role: tailoring Russian state narratives to fit Turkish sensibilities. Both institutions and their spokespeople use the same tactics of invoking in equal measure both popular and reviled figures and movements in Turkish society, and hammering out of them a narrative compatible with the Russian state’s messaging.
One often overlooked characteristic of the Russian state’s propaganda machine is its remarkable flexibility. While clumsy, often ridiculous, narratives stick in outsiders’ minds (such as anti-Slavic bioweapon facilities), what may fly under the radar is how the Russian state can simultaneously engage different cultures, ideologies and demographics with often contradictory narratives. The well-documented phenomenon of both far-right and far-left groups in the west tending to support Russia—usually for wildly disparate reasons—underlines this. Both RUSEN and the leadership of the Russian House in Ankara function in a similar manner, adapting pro-Russian narratives to their local audience.
This means that these institutions function as vectors of Russian soft power. With Türkiye now a fairly influential outside party in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it is a predictable target for increased pro-Russian messaging. Developing diplomatic and economic relations between the Russian and Turkish states may also provide further scope for this. As such, Türkiye may become an important battleground in the Russian state’s bid to sway public narratives to its side.
Ata Ahmet Kökçü
Ata Ahmet Kökçü specialises in OSINT and investigative journalism, covering a broad spectrum of topics such as politics, social issues, cybersecurity, conflict zones, defence systems, and organised crime, among others.
Christian Mamo
Christian Mamo is an investigative journalist and director of the OFU’s Center for Influence and Disinformation Research (CIDER). He specialises in international human rights law and geopolitics, and is currently focusing on Russian disinformation.
Lucas Tonks
Lucas Tonks is a writer and researcher whose work largely focuses on the intersection of technology, e-media, and politics.
