The Strudel of Influence Layer 1: The Russian Core of It All
Investigators/Authors: Deniz M. Dirisu, Christian Mamo
Edited by: Agata Pyka and Emma Urbanova
This investigation was realised with the support of Journalism Fund Europe.
Austria: the land of towering mountains, muscle-bound movie stars like Arnold Schwarzenegger and — let's not forget — the world's unrivalled apple strudels. But beneath these cultural layers lies something more complex and dark. In this series, we delve into what we have termed the Russian-Austrian strudel of influence, unravelling the insidious weave of Russian propaganda and disinformation that's currently permeating Austria's storied charm.
We will explore how Russia’s influence and information campaigns in Austria can be classified into three closely bound layers. The first layer of the strudel, “The Russian Core of It All”, reveals direct ties to Russian governmental structures such as embassies and cultural organisations under the country's foreign ministry. As we proceed with unrolling, the next layer presents Austrian public figures with strong ties to Russian entities, facilitating economic, political, and cultural exchanges between the two countries. The strudel's third layer focuses on direct implications for Austrian politics, showcasing the role of the Freedom Party of Austria and its most prominent politicians in spreading pro-Russian agenda in the Central European country.
In 1955, Austria’s statehood was reestablished under the condition that the new republic declared its political neutrality. This came to be a defining feature of Austrian politics, with the alpine nation still among the last few European states not to join NATO. Similarly, espionage is only a criminal offence if directed against the Austrian state. This, combined with the presence of major international relations’ headquarters, somewhat renders Austria a thriving hub for espionage, intrigue, and subterfuge - presently mainly coming from Russia. A European intelligence official quoted in the Financial Times described Austria as a “veritable aircraft carrier” of Russian espionage, adding that the country’s defence ministry is “practically a department of the GRU”.
The extent of the country’s Russian connections was unveiled in 2019 when a scandal dubbed the “Ibiza Affair” rocked the Austrian political scene, precipitating the collapse of the then-ruling coalition. A secretly recorded video was published, showing two high-ranking politicians of the right-wing FPO - former vice-chancellor of Austria Heinz-Christian Strache, then-chairman of the FPO, and his deputy Johann Gudenus - meeting with a woman posing as a Russian oligarch’s niece. In the video, the politicians are seen discussing the possibility of buying positive Russian media coverage in exchange for government contracts.
More recently, the Wirecard Scandal shed light on Jan Marsalek, apparently an important Russian asset in Austria. An Austrian citizen and the son of a suspected pro-Soviet spy, Marsalek came to international attention as the COO of the payment-processing firm Wirecard. Currently, Austrian and German intelligence speculate that he is living in Russia, under the protection of the GRU, after Wirecard was accused of committing financial fraud and Marsalek himself of spying for Russia.
However, these grandiose, high-profile, John le Carré-esque scandals only hint at the nature and the scope of the Russian state’s involvement in Austria. Such influence operations usually engage different echelons of society, gathering diverse stakeholders to align their efforts towards a common goal. In this section of our report, we focus on the topmost layer of the strudel - the official diplomatic and political assets of the Russian Federation currently operating in Austria, and the role they play in crystallising Russian influence in Austria, and by extension, Europe.
We start with the highest-ranking Russian institutions in the country - the Russian Embassy and the Permanent Mission to the OSCE. While such major institutions and their attached diplomats can reasonably be expected to be measured, gracious, and conciliatory, the Russian missions appear to buck this trend. A post from the official Facebook pages of the Russian Embassy in Vienna and the Russian Mission to the OSCE directly quoted Ambassador to the OSCE Lukashevich describing the massacre in Bucha as a “bloody staging” and “provocation” of the Ukrainian military. Lukashevich further supported this bogus claim on the Russian Mission’s Twitter account, claiming that the Russian military had actually distributed humanitarian supplies to residents of Bucha. In fact, searching “Bucha” on the mission’s Twitter page yields several other tweets propagating blatantly false information denying the massacre.
Lyubinsky also gave a revealing interview to the Austrian publication Profi, where he parroted Putin’s “denazification” justification of the invasion of Ukraine. In the interview, Lyubinsky ran through all the tired tropes and narratives around the Russian invasion - that Ukraine had been on the verge of launching an offensive on Russian proxies in Donbas, that the Ukrainian military uses civilians as human shields, and that Ukraine was producing chemical and biological weapons.
The Russian diplomatic missions also conduct operations beyond merely disseminating their representative state’s narratives. Part of their task also appears to be engaging local stakeholders and identifying potentially pliable partners and collaborators. One of these is Wolfgang Mayer, an executive at the food producer Backaldrin and a self-proclaimed “international networker, innovator and communications expert”. In 2019, Mayer was awarded the title of honorary consul of the Russian Federation in Linz, with Ambassador Lyubinsky bestowing the honours.
Beyond the official diplomatic missions to Austria and its resident international institutions, the Russian state also exerts influence through its controversial sanctioned agency Rossotrudnichestvo. Responsible for the Russian state’s cultural exchange programmes, the agency runs the various Russian Houses of Science and Culture found in cities throughout the world. As we explored in our report on the Russian House in Berlin, some of these institutions have attracted attention for activities that seem to go beyond the remit of a purely cultural establishment. In Berlin, for example, the premises of the institution are regularly used by far-right publication Compact, AfD politicians, and prominent pro-Russian activists in Germany.
Vienna’s Russian House appears to be less overtly political, withheir events ranging from a “competition aimed at the patriotic upbringing of children and youths” to conferences on the plight of Soviet POWs in the notorious Mauthausen concentration camp. However, their official Facebook page is littered with self-congratulatory posts about delivering “humanitarian aid” to Ukraine. Often, the posts mention aid being delivered to “DPR, LPR and Ukraine”, blatantly promoting and validating the annexation of Ukrainian territory. A caption for a postdisplayed below commemorating the victims of clashes in Odesa in 2014 writes that “Russia came out in defense of people who have been subjected to genocide by the Kyiv regime”, neglecting to mention that the clashes happened after the annexation of Crimea and the armed seizure of Sloviansk.
One particularly revealing post dates to March 2022, barely two weeks after the full-scale invasion. The Russian House’s Facebook page quoted four European politicians who had emerged with statements critical of Ukraine: two from AfD, one from Die Linke in Germany, and one from the French nationalist National Rally party. The statements tread familiar ground - American domination, the absurdity of sanctions, Ukrainian “Nazis” and Ukrainian corruption.
The Vienna Russian House is run by Oleg Ksenofontov, who maintains a scant online presence and in a 2007 interview revealed that he has been heading the institution since 2005 (confirmed upon request by the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), having served as a diplomat before. From 2013 to 2021, Ksenofontov was director of Berlin’s Russian House and head of the German division of Rossotrudnichestvo - both subdivisions of Russian state agencies which have garnered interest for their active collusion with local political actors, particularly the AfD.
According to the Austrian publication Bezirkszeitung, Ksenofontov “helped found” the Committee for Peace in Ukraine - a misleadingly titled activist group led by pro-Russian Ukrainian citizen Yaroslava Sidorenko. This group has regularly conducted rallies in Austria advocating against weapons deliveries to Ukraine while highlighting the regular Russian propaganda narratives about Ukraine. These rallies are also frequently attended by the associates of the Identitarian movement, including Patrick Poppel. The Russian House failed to address our questions regarding Ksenofontov’s involvement with the group. Nevertheless, Russian ambassador Lyubinsky remains bullish about the Russian House continuing its activities “in spite of the detractors”, as stated in an interview with state media.
Closely affiliated with Rossotrudnichestvo are the Coordination Councils of Russian Compatriots, or KSORS. This refers to an umbrella structure that unites the civil society organisations and institutions of the Russian diaspora, providing scope for collaboration with official state agencies. The end result is a mechanism which allows the Russian state to mobilise its diaspora. KSORS chapters in the United States have engaged in outright political lobbying, while the institution’s Berlin chapter has a former GRU officer as its representative.
Significantly, Austria’s KSORS made the headlines in 2022 when it was revealed that Vienna police had attended a seminar organised by them. The seminar was given by Elena Fedchenko, a former anti-Maidan activist, who portrayed herself as a “Ukrainian from Luhansk” despite only having moved there as an adult. In the seminar, she spoke about alleged Ukrainian atrocities in Donbas, using a famous fake taken from a film set to illustrate her point.. Fedchenko has also been involved with Sidorenko’s Committee for Peace in Ukraine.
Cultural Outposts/Assets of Russia
Apart from direct physical and state/diplomatic outposts of Russia in Austria, there exist cultural outposts of Russia in Austria or operating partly in Austria. These cultural outposts (both natural persons and organisations) are important cogs in the soft power mechanism Russia employs to garner sympathy and support for itself. By laundering narratives portraying Russia as a victim and making overtures to cultural exchange, rapprochement, and alternative geopolitical theories, these assets position themselves to disseminate state propaganda.
Friends of Crimea and the Yalta Forum
The birth child of the II Yalta International Economic Forum in 2017, a conference held by Russian authorities in occupied Crimea, the Friends of Crimea association hosts pro-Russian members from various European nations, including Austria. It is important to understand that the individuals from this organisation are not acting alone, but are rather supported and sanctioned by the Russian government. This is evident from the promotion and advertisement of Friends of Crimea on the websites of Russian state institutions such as the Russian Embassy in Brunei and on the website of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to international organisations in Vienna.
Further evidence of the ethos and motives of Friends of Crimea can be found on an official Russian government site in the DECLARATION OF THE 2ND FORUM OF FRIENDS OF CRIMEA. Several members of the Russian government were present at the Forum, such as the Deputy Chairman of the Crimean Council of Ministers Georgiy Muradov, Duma Deputy Mikhail Sheremet and Head of the Crimean Republic Sergey Aksyonov. All of these are key figures in the annexation and occupation of Crimea.
Forum of Friends of Crimea 2017, Muradov in the middle (Source)
Within the declaration, one can also ascertain the key goals and narratives of the organisation, namely: to legalise the illegitimate “referendum”; to fight the Western sanctions against Russia for its 2014 aggression against Ukraine; and to remove the “Crimean issue” from the world agenda. All this is veiled in the guise of “efforts to preserve peace, end confrontation in international affairs, and to restore constructive cooperation between Russia and Western countries”.
Several members of the pro-Russian Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) - Detlef Wimmer, Hans-Jörg Jenewein, Axel Kassegger and Barbara Rosenkranz - participated in the Yalta International Economic Forum, the conference which begat Friends of Crimea. It was revealed that many foreign participants in the Forum, including the Austrians, had been attracted through payments conducted by Russian assets in Europe. (Connection to Layer 2 and 3)
Detlef Wimmer, vice-mayor of Linz, warrants a closer look. Wimmer is a participant of the Yalta International Economic Forum who has been investigated for ties to far right elements, banned from Ukraine, and denounced by the Ukrainian Ambassador to Austria. However, his participation in politics was curtailed after the fallout of the Ibiza scandal took down several Russian members of FPO., Not all compromised figures were equally affected: Axel Kassegger is still present in Austrian politics as an FPO member of the National Council and has advocated for the removal of sanctions on Russia and for the EU to stop sending support to Ukraine. (Connection to Layer 2)
After the full-scale invasion, the Friends of Crimea continued their activities largely unhindered, conductingtwo telling acts. In the first, on the second day of the invasion, the society called on “USA and other NATO countries to initiate constructive dialogue with Russia about mutual security”. And in the second, the society held an online conference four months later, on 21 June 2022, with foreign members of the Friends of Crimea association joining in.
The press release from the conference sums up the narrative espoused there: “it is necessary to support Russia in all directions in its fight against Nazism, above all in Ukraine”, whichclearly in line with the rhetoric that the Russian propaganda apparatus has conjured up in order to dehumanise the Ukrainian people.
Photos from the online conference of the International Association of the Friends of Crimea in June 2022 (source)
A notable figure for our investigation is Patrick Poppel, whom the association’s website lists as a board member. An Austrian national, Poppel is well known for his pro-Russian political activity, and is suspected of being a Kremlin asset and stooge, as evident from his impressively pro-Russian CV. Poppel is the former Secretary-General of the Austria-based pro-Kremlin Suvorov Institute, a right-wing pundit and “election observer” for various Russian-backed elections in occupied Crimea (observer at the 2018 Russian presidential election) and occupied Donetsk (observer at the 2018 general elections).
The Yalta conference in 2017 and the resulting Friends of Crimea association exposed many of the Kremlin’s connections within Austria (both small and large). The second part of our investigation will take a closer look at these networks.
The Vanguard of the Russian Gospel in Right-Wing Europe: Alexander Dugin and Konstantin Malofeev
Connected to the annexation of Crimea and Donbas, the II Yalta Conference, and to the Friends of Crimea are two key figures of pro-Russia right-wing movements: “moneyman” Konstantin Malofeev and ideologue Alexander Dugin. A significant portion of their initiatives in Europe appear to operate autonomously, despite being moulded according to the Kremlin's preferences and operating in harmony with the ideology of Russian leadership. This way, the Kremlin attains plausible deniability and attaches the veil of independent thought to the narratives these actors spread throughout Europe, as the best way to disinform a person is to make them believe that your narrative is actually their own narrative (source).
Alexander Dugin, and the leader of Russian Proxy Donetsk People's Republic, Denis Pushilin, at a rally in central Moscow in support of the people of Donbass on June 11, 2014.ITAR-TASS/ Zurab Dzhavakhadze
Konstantin Malofeev is an oligarch who began his service to the Kremlin by financing and supporting pro-Russian separatism in Eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. This is evident from his close links to Igor Girkin (the man held responsible for the MH-17 incident), who provided security for Malofeev. On the other hand, Alexander Dugin is an “academic” who is considered the founder of neo-eurasianism and multipolarism. Dugin has attracted attention as an ideologue for the Kremlin where he asserts that the invasion of Ukraine is necessary in order to conduct a “holy war” against evil and Nazism.
“The other day near Bakhmut, together with my friend and comrade-in-arms Oleksandr Borodai, we presented the Tsaregrad Crosses to several dozen soldiers of the Union of Donbas Volunteers. The Bastion Battalion (formerly Kherson) of the St George's Brigade and the BARS-13 Russian World unit.” September 2023 (source)
In 2014, the connection between Malofeev and Dugin was exposed via a leak. Since 2014, both men have been maintaining ties between themselves and Austrian right-wing parties such as FPÖ. In May 2014, Dugin participated in a clandestine meeting with Heinz-Christian Strache (FPÖ) and other right-wing politicians from around the EU at Palais Liechtenstein which was financed by Malofeev, causing controversy in Austria and Europe. In the meeting, Dugin stated: “We must conquer and join Europe. We are supported by a pro-Russian fifth column in Europe.” (Connection to Layer 2 and 3)
A lesser known connection is Dugin's development of further pro-Russian actors in Austria such as the Identitarian movement and the Suworow Institute led by Alexander Markowics and Patrick Poppel who used to be the Secretary-General of the Suworow Institute (source) (Connection to Layer 2)
Patrick Poppel with Alexander Dugin at the Suvorov Institute in Vienna, winter 2018 (source)
His latest event at the Suworow Institute, an online conference, was held in the spring of 2024. At this conference, Dugin denied Ukrainian identity and embraced Russian imperialism by asserting that the Ukrainian desire for independence is a Western transplant. His speech can be encapsulated in the following quote: “it is a civil war waged by representatives of the same people - the Russian people. A part of this people is conscious of its unity. These are Russian citizens, and other parts of this people are not aware of their unity.”
The Sochi Dialogue and the “Model Diplomacy” Outposts
Lastly, during the rapprochement era between Russia and Austria in the 2010s , a key forum of cooperation was created between the two countries. On February 28, 2018, the proposal to create the Russian-Austrian civil society forum named "Sochi Dialogue" was discussed in Moscow between the Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz. Later, on June 5, 2018, the Sochi Dialogue was officially launched in Vienna during a meeting between President Putin and Austrian President Dr. Alexander Van der Bellen, where they agreed on its implementation.
Since then, the Sochi Dialogue has been crucially mentioned during a meeting with members of the Sochi Dialogue Russian-Austrian Public Forum’s core group in Vienna on August 25, 2021, where the opening remarks were given by Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. In the post-full-scale invasion era, the dialogue remains active, as is evident from the Anniversary celebration for the Russian-Austrian Forum “Sochi Dialogue” at the Russian State University for the Humanities, dated 15th of July 2023. Most recently, the Sochi Dialogue Forum organised a concert by the great jazz pianist Daniil Kramer at the Russian House in Vienna on 25 April 2024.
Furthermore, the “Sochi Dialogue” is co-chaired by Dr. Christoph Leitl from the Austrian side and from the Russian side, it is led by Andrei Fursenko, advisor to the President of Russia and former Minister of Education (2004-2012). Both persons are known for their proximity and connection to Putin and his policies. Andrei Fursenko has been under sanctions since 2014 for his role in the annexation of Crimea and support of pro-Russian proxies in Donbas by the United States, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and more. In addition, Christoph Leitl, during his presidency of Austria's Chamber of Commerce and in a meeting with Putin during the latter's visit to Austria in June 2014, said jokingly that “Austria and Russia both owned slices of Ukraine 100 years ago”. An interjection from the audience, light-heartedly calling Leitl’s prolonged presidency of the business organisation a “dictatorship”, was answered by Putin in fine German: “But a good dictatorship”.
Screenshot from the website of the Honorary Consul of Russia in Upper Austria Wolfgang Mayer.
The Sochi Dialogue website, among other pro-Russian and Russo-Austrian websites, is still featured on the website of the Honorary Consul of Russia in Upper Austria Wolfgang Mayer. Back in 2020, Mayer was invited to give a lecture at the MGIMO School of Business and International Proficiency organised with the support of the Russian-Austrian public forum Sochi Dialogue (source). (Connection to Layer 2)
Apart from the direct pro-Russian and Russophile individuals in the organisation, there are indirect ties to other organisations. After ascertaining the IP address of the Sochi Dialogue website and running a reverse IP search, the results yield only 7 websites registered on the same IP address.
The low number of websites suggests that it is very likely that it is not an Internet Service Provider address that hosts a lot of addresses, indicating that the creators or registrants of the websites are the same group and organisation. This does add up when considering that all websites linked are Russian foreign policy related, such as rami.ru - Russian International Studies Association, and the Moscow Model United Nations website (an organisation that is already connected to MGIMO - Moscow State Institute of International Relations).
Model United Nations conferences are aimed at students to participate in simulations of the UN system/model of debate and collaboration where controversial and geopolitical topics would be debated and resolutions would be drafted with the intent of peaceful resolution (ironic considering the current Russian aggression). The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine did not hinder the conferences hosted by the Moscow Model United Nations where in the March 2023 newsletter, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was depicted on the cover and praised for his professionalism. This is the same minister who once tried to justify the Nazi slur regarding Ukraine's president, who is Jewish, by making the ridiculous claim that Adolf Hitler had "Jewish blood" - a true example for aspiring Russian diplomats and emissaries.
Screenshots from the C-MIMUN March 2023 newsletter
The Sochi Dialogue, MGIMO, and the Moscow Model United Nations organisation are Russia’s “model diplomacy” soft power assets of the Kremlin which serve to showcase the country’s diplomatic practices; its “commitment to diplomacy and peace”; and foster global connections through large conferences, symposiums, and cultural/educational exchanges, aligning with the Kremlin's broader goals of enhancing its influence and promoting its cultural and political values abroad. The Russian House, KSORS, Friends of Crimea, and Sochi Dialogue Forum are perfect examples of such practices being conducted in Austria - revealing the covert Russian core of it all.
Deniz M. Dirisu
Deniz M. Dirisu, the Founder and General Director of OSINT FOR UKRAINE is an international criminal law Specialist and OSINT investigator, with a proven track record in ICL investigations and investigative journalism. Experienced in building and leading diverse teams across borders, Deniz M. Dirisu is active within the realm of international justice and OSINT.
Christian Mamo
Christian is an investigative journalist and director of CIDER. He specialises in international human rights law and geopolitics and is currently focusing his work on Russian disinformation.
Agata Pyka
Agata Pyka is an assistant editor at Notes from Poland and a freelance investigative journalist. She specialises in Polish and European politics as well as Russian disinformation.
