The Alligator Still Lingers

An investigation into the state of one of Russia’s infamous weapon systems that seemingly “disappeared”

Investigators/Authors: Deniz M. Dirisu, Agata Pyka, Vyacheslav Kolomeets and M.K. (Redacted for privacy)

Edited by: Orlaith Delaney

On 16 November 2023, Twitter/X user david D (@secretsqrl123) set off a wave of speculation by asserting that the Russian KA-52 Close-Air Support (CAS) helicopter fleet – one of Russia's most powerful weapon systems, often colloquially called “the Alligator”–was missing in action. This particular helicopter fleet has been instrumental in Russia’s defence against the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive, notably because a lack of short-range air defence systems have left the Ukrainian side particularly vulnerable against attacks from these aircraft. david D’s viral claim that the helicopter fleet was suddenly absent from the battlefield therefore led to a surge of misinformation, fueled by confirmation biases and a lack of critical analysis.

In the fog of war, misinformation can often go rampant, perfectly illustrated by this incident. As we explore the events that transpired following David's claims, we encounter a clash between unsupported speculation and diligent open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysis, showcasing how crucial critical analysis is in building a full picture and piercing the uncertainties of a war-time context, and ultimately leading us to a more accurate understanding of the current state of the KA-52 operations.

This article also highlights the crucial role of open-source analysts, such as Tatarigami (@Tatarigami_UA) and Rob Lee (@RALee85), who meticulously counterbalance misleading narratives with fact-based assessments. 

Wading Through the Swamp of Misinformation 

On 16 November 2023, Twitter/X user david.D (@secretsqrl123) posted a picture of a Russian KA-52 CAS helicopter captioned “MISSING” in red, bold letters, while claiming that the fleet had been missing for about a week. David was alleging that the Russian KA-52 CAS fleet in service with the Russian Military had been destroyed or rendered inoperable by Ukrainian forces. 

In the weeks leading up to the post, Russian air force activity radically decreased, leading some to assume the KA-52 fleet was no longer operational, as exemplified by David’s post.   

However, when looking at engagement with the post, the top requotes/reposts are users debunking the claims. One example is a quote by Rob Lee (@RALee85), a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, who discredited/verified/corrected David’s claim: “Ka-52 helicopters are still operating, and they are still a serious problem. Russia began operating helicopters from FARPs (Forward arming and refuelling points) soon after the ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System) strike. Just because you don't see videos of them does not mean they are not there.” As evidence Rob Lee presented an OSINT analysis by Tatarigami (@Tatarigami_UA), another “OSINTer” on Twitter/X, who analysed satellite imagery of Russian forward air bases to determine whether Russia still maintains operational KA-52 helicopters. 

Using the satellite imagery taken in autumn 2023, such as that below from Kirovske (occupied Crimea) air base, Tatarigami examined the helicopters on the tarmacs of Taganrog and Zernograd (Rostov region), Buturlinovka (Voronezh region), Rovenki (Belgorod region), and Kirovske (occupied Crimea) air bases. 

In the first satellite image of Taganrog air base taken on 1 November (see below), Tatarigami was able to identify what looked like four operational KA-52 helicopters parked. A question immediately arose among observers online and prominent figures in the OSINT community: are the helicopters identified by Tatarigami actually KA-52s? 

Analysing the satellite imagery obtained ourselves, we confirm Tatarigami’s analysis that there are several distinct identifying characteristics of the KA-52, such as the two coaxial rotors and a short tail, that can be confidently determined from the images. 

The KA-52 is one of the rare Russian coaxial rotor (double rotor, as pictured above in the left-hand orange box) attack helicopter. Most Russian helicopters, including other types of attack helicopters such as the Mil Mi-8, are single rotor helicopters that have one main horizontal rotor and a smaller stabilising vertical tail rotor (pictured below). 

The only other active coaxial rotor helicopter in service with the Russian Military is not an attack helicopter but an anti-submarine warfare helicopter (KA-27, pictured below) of the Russian Navy, which has a different frontal shape and tail section than the KA-52.

Therefore, by looking at satellite imagery alone it can be deduced that in November 2023 there were operational KA-52s at Russian air bases.

Going Deeper into the Swamp

We decided to dive into the swamp ourselves and investigate (and analyse) a recent video published by the Russian Ministry of Defence (MOD) on the KA-52 for further information and intelligence about the status of the fleet. 

A video posted on Telegram by the Russian MOD, dated 16 December 2023, showed a group of helicopters, including a KA-52, lifting off from an airfield with the caption: “Army Aviation attack group struck the cluster of manpower, as well as enemy armoured vehicles in Krasny Liman direction”.

There are various signs indicating the likely legitimacy of the 16 December video. In the first part of the video, a pilot is seen entering the cockpit (marked in yellow in the photo below) of a KA-52. The KA-52 is in a visibly unclean and worn-down condition (marked in orange in the photo below), most likely due to long flights or combat. 

Furthermore, a striking feature of the video is the fact that there is only a single KA-52 (marked in orange in the photo below) among many Mi-8-type helicopters, which could indicate a low number of KA-52s left in Russia’s arsenal. Further supporting the veracity of the video is the blurring of strategic buildings by the Russian Military publishers for operational security reasons (marked with yellow arrows). 

Lastly, the video provides footage of the KA-52 taking off, flying and firing its S-8 rockets (S-8 tubes have been marked in orange) as an indirect artillery platform towards what is assumed to be Ukrainian positions.

Furthermore, the OSINTer Tatarigami analysed helicopters at multiple Russian air bases close to the frontline, excluding those clearly undergoing maintenance (evident due to missing rotor blades) and trying to account for possible duplicates due to satellite imagery being recorded at different times, and for possible misidentifications. He concludes that:

 “15/ In summary, …satellite evidence collectively indicates that Russia currently maintains a fleet of at least 25 operational Ka-52 helicopters, with the actual number likely much higher.” 

This example shows us that even though we do not know exactly how many operational helicopters the Russian forces still possess, OSINT analysis can make us confident that at least more than a dozen remain operational, mostly in Russian air bases instead of in occupied Ukraine - and that Daniel’s viral claim is false.

Finding the Reptile’s Lair

The maximum operational range of the KA-52 helicopter is approximately 460-480 kilometers (km), which allows us to delineate a significant area around Liman, where Russia claims to have successfully attacked Ukrainian forces. This radius encompasses key strategic locations, including the Taganrog, Millerovo and Rostov airbases, as well as airfields in occupied territories such as Severodonetsk, Luhansk and Donetsk. These areas hold strategic importance due to their proximity to conflict zones and their potential use for military operations.

Initial clues from supplementary video analysis

1. Additional footage [link has been deleted since] of the same airfield reveals distinctive features. Notably, the runway markings include "PMC" (Радиомаячная система), indicative of an instrument landing system (ILS). This technology enhances pilot navigation during landing, especially in reduced visibility conditions. The ILS zone is typically demarcated on the approach paths to the main runway.

2. Moreover, the positioning of helicopters in what appears to be a secluded area or “pocket” rather than the primary runway is evident from various angles in the footage.

3. Also, an irregular alignment of concrete plates on the runway is visible, suggesting a unique structural characteristic of this specific airfield.

Analysing satellite imagery

Upon examining satellite images of the aforementioned airbases, two locations–Millerovo and Taganrog–exhibit the unique feature of non-aligned concrete plates on the runway, mirroring the observation in the video (additional footage). A closer inspection of Millerovo airfield reveals a concurrence of all three distinctive characteristics identified in the footage.

In this satellite image from December 2023, a “pocket” (marked in yellow) next to the main runway start zone is visible, similar to the size and shape of the “pocket” in which the KA-52 helicopter was standing in the MOD video. 

Akin to those in the additional footage, the runway and taxiway lines in the satellite images do not follow a uniformly straight path but display a mismatched formation (marked in yellow). Furthermore, the "PMC" markings (marked in red) on the runway are spaced widely, contrasting with the closely written markings observed at Rostov airfield.

Measuring distance and calculating same range from Millerovo to the frontline

A range measurement of the distance from Millerovo airfield to the Lyman area indicates a straight-line distance of approximately 180 km. This falls comfortably within the KA-52's maximum operational range, suggesting that the airfield is a feasible origin point for helicopter operations in the Lyman area.

Considering the combination of the KA-52's range capabilities, the unique structural and navigational characteristics of Millerovo airfield observed in the video, and the geographical proximity to Lyman, it is highly probable that the helicopters seen in the aforementioned Russian MOD video originated from the Millerovo airfield in Russia.

Finding the Exact Alligator

While the video was posted by the MOD on 16 December 2023, it is uncertain whether the date of the footage is accurate, as the video posted could have repurposed old footage published for disinformation purposes. However, taking a closer look at the KA-52 helicopter in the video can provide an idea about the video’s timing as well as the deployment of the KA-52 helicopter. 

Initial Serial Number Analysis

The helicopter in the video features the serial number "800 НВ N°1490А, 11.03.2023”. The "НВ" (несущего винта вертолета) designates the rotor of the helicopter, a crucial component for identification. However, in this specific case the number did not significantly narrow down the search for the exact helicopter in the video. 

Despite this, such serial numbers are pivotal in identifying helicopters and their operational areas. A similar video from October featured a helicopter with the number “0120K” and the same date, suggesting a pattern in numbering.

Comparative Video Analysis

Our search efforts were extended to images of the KA-52 from the video. In the video, the serial/registration number of the KA-52 (marked in red) is partly blurred, though the last number–four (4)–is visible. 

A reverse image search led to a Facebook page, Espada & Escudo, which provided an unblurred photo of a helicopter with the serial number RF-91334, in the exact position where it was blurred in the Russian MOD video, therefore allowing us to presume the helicopters to be one and the same. Furthermore, the Facebook page dates the picture from December 2023, thereby further indicating the recency of the videos and the KA-52 deployments. 

Serial number search provides historical insights

Delving deeper into the serial number RF-91334 via plane/helicopter spotting sites and registry documents reveals the past deployments of the specific helicopter. 

1. Registration/CN: RF-91334/42 WHITE / 35382609005.

2. Additional photos from various air shows further corroborated the details.

3. A Bulgarian registry of KA-52 helicopters from 2014-2015 provided additional context.

1. The registry of all Kamov products, when searched with the serial number 35382609005 (on page 52), revealed extensive details about this specific helicopter:

1. The "42" white KA-52, part of the Russian Air Force, was handed over by the manufacturers on 25 December 2013 and was operational with the 3rd squadron of the 15th brigade at Ostrov-Veretye. It was last noted in Arsenyev on the same date.

2. The aircraft was in a grey colour scheme, with 'VVS Rossii' titles and Russian stars.

3. Further investigation into the manufacturing history linked the helicopter to the “Progress” aircraft factory in Arsenyev, Primorsky Krai. This connection provides vital insight into the helicopter's origin and manufacturing details. 

A Change of Behaviour for the Reptile?

In its KA-52 propaganda videos, the Russian MOD usually states that the KA-52 conducted a sortie near Liman in the Donetsk region of occupied Ukraine. Even though indirect artillery sorties were and are common throughout the war in Ukraine, during the Ukrainian counteroffensive, the KA-52 played an active role in attacking Ukrainian armoured formations, trying to break through the Surovikin defensive lines. During their attacks, the KA-52s also directly target the Ukrainian armour with their sights and fire 9-A-4172K Vikhr-1 ATGM (Anti-Tank Guided Missiles) at a range of 5 km. 

Screenshot from HUD (Head Up Display) footage inside a KA-52 helicopter provided by the RU MOD: “A Ka-52 helicopter crew destroyed an AFU armoured fighting vehicle with a direct guided missile hit.” (https://t.me/mod_russia_en/8781)

A case example of the utilisation of the helicopters is the KA-52 attack during the summer in the vicinity of Vrimensky ridge, Donetsk, another heavily contested area of operations. 

KA-52 helicopters fly fire missions approximately 8 km away from the ‘zero’ line to stay out of range of Ukrainian MANPADS (man-portable air-defense systems). They engage Ukrainian armour out in the countryside on both the right and left side of the Vrimensky ridge, sometimes even flying firing missions above the southern range of settlements that mark the Vrimensky ridge axis.

A still from a Ka-52 HUD video, “recently released” (according to the Twitter/X post by @GuyPlopsky) by the Russian MoD, showing the moment a 9-A-4172K Vikhr-1 ATGM (Anti - Tank Guided Missile) is launched against a target from a slant range of ~7.9 km. (https://twitter.com/GuyPlopsky/status/1698616920755634660) 

The same goes for KA-52 flying missions on the Bakhmut axis of attack. These helicopters fly firing missions around 9 km from areas of active combat on the zero line near Klischiivka. They are effective at both dodging MANPADS’ range and engaging enemy armour targets in the vicinity of these fighting positions. These helicopters are most likely stationed at Luhansk airport.

The videos published in December 2023 by the Russian MOD have no visuals of the KA-52 using targeting systems of the helicopter to strike targets. Only the indirect fire mode also known as “lobbing” missiles is shown in the videos. 

This tactic can be described as performing attack runs with unguided rockets fired from their pods, flying low and then pitching up just to fire the salvo of rockets, and then again go back to low altitude to protect from air defences (outlined below in orange is the KA-52 and the yellow arrow points to the indirect S-8 missiles being fired).

The KA-52s were already engaging the Ukrainian units from afar during the summer counteroffensive. However, it seems that the KA-52s now opt to only conduct indirect salvos (an assertion that could be subject to change), as they are being forced to launch from bases further away within Russia due to the threat that ATACMS missiles pose to the air bases in occupied Ukraine. 

The Reptiles Retreat Back to Their Lair

Initially, the Russian Air Force used the Russian air base in occupied Berdyansk to launch KA-52 attack helicopters against the Ukrainian counteroffensive. 

Image of the taken Berdyansk airport with several KA-52 in sight - 21 June 2023 (https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1671662482639708160/photo/1)

The HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) given to Ukraine initially did not possess ATACMS missiles, thus preventing the Ukrainian military from striking the forward air bases of the KA-52s in occupied Ukraine. Fortunately for Kyiv, ATACMS missiles were supplied by the United States in October 2023, and consequently had a significant impact on the Russian Air Force and the KA-52 fleet stationed in the forward air bases. 

A notable ATACMS strike with cluster munitions was conducted around 17 October 2023, targeting the Berdyansk Airfield in occupied Ukraine. Radio Svoboda published high-resolution satellite imagery of the aftermath of the Ukrainian strikes with ATACMS missiles with cluster munitions on the airfield (with some of the destroyed Russian helicopters, including the KA-52 attack helicopter, denoted below by red arrows, by the authors of this investigation). The estimates for the strike damage vary within the scope of five to eight helicopters destroyed, with seven KA-52s confirmed as destroyed, according to Oryx blog analyst Jakub. 

In the analysis of this satellite imagery, we only marked clearly visible destroyed and damaged helicopters, which can be deduced to have been mostly KA-52s because most other helicopters in the airfield, like the Mi-8s, most likely did not carry ammunition that would cause explosions. Consequently, the full extent of the damage might be known to us from the satellite images. 

Several KA-52s were also damaged but not destroyed in the attack. This damage has been further admitted to on Russian Telegram channels, where images have been posted of the damaged KA-52s that clearly show the impact of ATACMS cluster munitions (marked by us in orange boxes.)

This strike was one of the two large-scale Ukrainian strikes on airfields in occupied Ukraine, which caused in total the destruction or damage of 15 KA-52 helicopters. It is worth noting that the damaged helicopters would be out of action for weeks or months, depending on the ability of the Russian Air Force to repair the highly expensive and rare KA-52s. The image above shows only damage done to the exterior of the helicopter; assuming that the cluster munition fragments penetrated the cockpit, they may have also damaged internal computing systems and sights, further complicating the return of this KA-52 to active combat. 

The ATACMS strikes can be assessed to be significant enough on the Russian KA-52 fleet, whose numbers even in its heyday did not surpass 100 helicopters. With the increased risk of strikes on forward air bases, the Russian Military further withdrew their air bases into Russia proper, away from the reach of the ATACMS, while only keeping their FARPs as intermediary points between air bases and strike locations for helicopters.

Conclusion

Following a trail of misinformation from David, we have been able to analyse and come to the likely conclusion that the Russian KA-52 fleet indeed is still operational; however, their current numbers are estimated to have been reduced to less than 30 helicopters. Furthermore, one of the reasons for the decrease in numbers of KA-52 is the losses the fleet suffered due to attrition during the Ukrainian summer counteroffensive against AD (Air Defence) systems, as well as the crippling strikes on their forward bases by ATACMS missiles. This forced the Russian Air Force to relocate main air bases back to Russia while increasing their reliance on FARPs as intermediary temporary base-like systems to refuel and rearm KA-52s during their missions, and made it impossible for Russia to permanently station helicopters or aircraft in occupied Ukraine due to threat of further losses to already depleted fleet of KA-52s. 

The intent of this analysis is not to cast accusations of misinformation on the Ukrainian side, but to highlight the broader issue of baseless assertions made by individuals identifying as open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysts, which can rapidly disseminate amid the confirmation bias prevalent on both sides of the conflict, while at the same time illustrating the crucial value of proper OSINT analysis. 

Furthermore, the persistent efforts of the Russian propaganda apparatus to disseminate disinformation and encourage misinformation are evident, while reckless and speculative actions by individuals such as David have the detrimental consequence of causing unwarranted reputational damage to the Ukrainian war effort. This comes at a time when Ukraine is already grappling with increased difficulties, including potential isolation by Western partners due, in part, to the spread of disinformation and misinformation propagated by Russian entities in the West.

The war on the ground has shifted to another phase and so has the informational war. We must remain critical and vigilant - failing to do so could leave us vulnerable to manipulation and being consumed by unidentified misinformation, much like an unsuspecting prey falling victim to an alligator in murky waters.

Investigators/authors

Deniz M Dirisu 

Deniz M Dirisu, the Founder and General Director of OSINT FOR UKRAINE is an International Criminal Law Specialist and OSINT Investigator, with a proven track record in ICL investigations and investigative journalism. Experienced in building and leading diverse teams across borders, Deniz M Dirisu is active within the realm of international justice and OSINT.

Agata Pyka

Agata Pyka is an assistant editor at Notes from Poland and a freelance investigative journalist. She specialises in Polish and European politics as well as Russian disinformation.

Vyacheslav Kolomeets

Vyacheslav is a Lead Investigator and OSINT specialist. He is actively engaged in advocating for the use of OSINT and investigative techniques to combat corruption and human rights abuses, particularly those perpetrated by armed forces in conflict regions. Vyacheslav's dedication to justice and his passion for IT and OSINT led him to pursue a career in investigative work.