Mapping Russia’s War Machine on NATO’s Doorstep

By: Anna Gielewska, Anastasiia Morozova, Daniel Flis (Frontstory.pl/VSquare.org), Mindaugas Aušra, Indrė Makaraitytė (LRT), Oliver Kund, Kaur Maran, Holger Roonemaa (Delfi Estonia)

Visualizations: Mart Nigola, Hele-Mai Kulleste (Delfi Estonia), Anastasiia Morozova  (Frontstory.pl/VSquare.org)

OSINT analysis: OSINT for Ukraine

Just an hour and a half by car from the Grzechotki border crossing (Poland) lies Parusnoye village (known in Lithuanian as Gaudikai). A specialized Russian GRU intelligence unit is stationed here, only a few kilometers from the naval base in Baltiysk. The unit trains saboteurs before dispatching them to conduct attacks on Poland and the Baltic states.

According to security and military sources, interviewed by LRT, up to 120 military personnel work at this base, including support staff. These are commandos, experts in underwater, maritime, land, and airborne operations. When the Nord Stream pipelines exploded at the bottom of the Baltic Sea in September 2022, divers from Parusnoye were initially suspected as being behind it (it’s now known that the trail leads to divers from Ukraine).

Men—and only men—are selected from the ranks of contract soldiers and so-called active reserves (excluding conscripts) to join the special unit in Parusnoye. Requirements? According to LRT’s sources, minimum height of 172 cm (roughly 5’6 feet), no phobias (e.g., claustrophobia), and exceptional physical fitness. Knowledge of foreign languages is considered an additional asset.

Together with Frontstory.pl, Estonia’s Eesti Ekspress, and Lithuania’s LRT, VSquare analyzed the locations of Russian military bases along the borders of Estonia and Latvia from Murmansk to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea, between Poland and Lithuania. We also added the coordinates of military bases in Belarus, a vassal state of Russia, to our map. 

During our months-long joint investigation, we identified key points of military infrastructure; commissioned high-resolution satellite images of the bases; and verified Russia’s actual military capabilities near Poland and the Baltic countries’ borders with the help of military and intelligence sources and experts from renowned organizations in Central Eastern Europe. We also analyzed the changes in these locations over recent years.

The satellite images were provided by Planet.com and analyzed with the help of the investigative foundation OSINT For Ukraine. Former and current military commanders from Poland, Lithuania, and Estonia assisted us in analyzing the materials and commented on our findings as well as Russian capabilities. General Ben Hodges, former commander of U.S. Army Europe, was also interviewed as an expert.

Parusnoye-stationed saboteurs from Reconnaissance Unit No. 390—known as the 390th Special Purpose Reconnaissance Point and sometimes still referred to by its previous designation, 561—are trained for missions against NATO along the Baltic coast. Their training includes executing attacks on strategic targets in countries like Lithuania and Poland. Last summer, the Russian Ministry of Defense communicated about an exercise involving 70 personnel from this unit. Divers practiced jumping from helicopters with parachutes into the sea.

Satellite images of the Parusnoye area reveal significant investments in the base over the past decade. These include the construction of a new training building; a helipad; and an underwater training pool illuminated at night. According to sources familiar with the Russian military investments, interviewed by our Lithuanian partners at LRT, divers are also training in the Curonian Lagoon. They also have training sites in the Russian part of the Curonian Spit, in the towns of Lesnoy (Šarkuva), Rybachy (Rasytės), and also close to the Lithuanian border in Morskoye.

Fire, Fear and Sabotage

In early 2024, Poland’s Internal Security Agency (ABW) detained Sergei S., and in doing so prevented a planned attack on a large chemical plant (Dekoral Center) in Wrocław. Sergei had received instructions for the arson attack on Telegram from a mysterious contact named Aleksei. According to case files described by Gazeta Wyborcza, Sergei’s phone was registered in Kaliningrad before arriving in Lower Silesia (and even in the U.S.); however, he denies ever being in Kaliningrad.

Despite this, Sergei admits that Russian services were behind his operation. In October, in response to this case, Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski announced the closure of the Russian consulate in Poznań. “We have seen similar arson cases across Europe, and we are aware of Russia’s plans for further attacks,” the minister said.

According to a European intelligence source, NATO has obtained intelligence of Russian plans targeting critical and civilian infrastructure—including in Poland. Experts suggest these attacks are designed to pressure the West into restricting Ukrainian attacks on Russian targets.

Could the trail of saboteurs setting Europe ablaze lead back to Parusnoye? Our sources within Polish government services and Lithuanian intelligence neither confirm nor deny this connection: “It cannot be ruled out that Russian intelligence and security services based in Kaliningrad are involved in planning and executing attacks in the region,” Lithuanian intelligence said in response to our request for comment.

Lithuania: They’ve Been Here Before

In 2016, Artūras Paulauskas, then head of Lithuania’s Parliamentary National Security and Defense Committee, sounded the alarm. Just two years after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and amid the ongoing war in Donbas, Paulauskas disclosed in a high-profile interview that Russian saboteurs had possibly crossed the Lithuanian border near a Juodkrantė resort the previous year as part of exercises. Prior intelligence reports from Lithuanian agencies had already warned of Russian infiltration.

Paulauskas explained, “I wanted to make it clear to the other side that we are aware of their actions—that we are not asleep… I emphasized to everyone that the era of détente was over, that we had to strengthen our intelligence and defense, and invest more money in this.”

Sources familiar with the investigation told LRT that, in 2015, saboteurs from Russia’s 561st Naval Reconnaissance Station (later renamed the 390th) might have landed in Juodkrantė. This region includes the port at Klaipėda and strategic sites along the Baltic coast, which are vital to NATO operations—and to Russian intelligence and sabotage efforts. 

Klaipėda’s strategic location makes it indispensable for NATO’s supply chains, for Baltic operations, and for regional defense in the Baltic Sea. Klaipėda is an ice-free port, operational all year round, handling bulk cargo, energy resources and military equipment. Palanga Airport is also nearby.

GRU unit members are trained to operate on foreign territory, identifying key locations for sabotage and monitoring NATO logistics and supply chains. This marine special ops team from Parusnoye is, theoretically, capable of infiltrating Lithuanian territory and, for instance, destroying port infrastructure. 

How? By using medium-sized submarines such as the Piranha or diving transports, the 390th unit is able to carry out clandestine landings on the outskirts of the harbor, neutralize security forces and take control of key areas in readiness for larger-scale operations. The unit can combine cyber warfare with physical attacks, disrupting port operational systems while conducting covert sabotage operations to delay or weaken NATO capabilities.

“If we are talking and preparing for day X when Russia decides to attack NATO, then this subversive group will have done its job by day X,” says one of LRT’s sources who assisted the investigation into Russian sabotage activity.

The Russian saboteurs’ training plan, as described by LRT’s intelligence source, drawn up in 2015 at the very time of the alleged Juodkrantė landing, specifies that the reconnaissance/diversion group is to concentrate first on the Lithuanian border. The document instructs the saboteurs to cross the Lithuanian border undetected within 10 to 12 days; to then cross through Lithuanian territory equally undetected; and then to concentrate at a certain location on the Baltic coast and set up an observation post.

The GRU unit from Parusnoye is considered by experts to be one of Russia’s most dangerous units near NATO’s borders.

Kaliningrad as seen from the Lithuanian side. Source: Lithuanian Ministry of Defense

Kaliningrad’s Threats

Kaliningrad, however, is not just a staging ground for saboteurs. It also houses Iskander short-range missiles, which Russia deployed near the Polish border for the first time in 2016. In February 2024, two years into the war in Ukraine, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk was visiting Berlin and Paris and stressed, “The nuclear threat is not abstract. Since the invasion of Ukraine, Putin has used it repeatedly to pressure the West.”

Tusk highlighted that Russia recently modernized its nuclear arsenal. “Warsaw and Berlin are within range of Russia’s Iskander missiles. There are about 100 nuclear warheads—maybe more. They’ve been upgraded for a reason, and their numbers have increased for a reason,” he stated.

A close aide to Tusk confided to VSquare, “At that time, he was constantly talking about the threat of war. I hadn’t seen him so concerned in a long time. He’d just returned from the U.S., pessimistic about the outlook. He must have received detailed reports on developments at the borders.”

In June 2024, foreign minister Radosław Sikorski echoed this concern at the Ukraine Reconstruction Conference, stating, “Russia likely has around 100 nuclear warheads stationed in Kaliningrad, posing a real risk to the European Union.” The minister reminded attendees that Russian missiles have already violated Polish airspace on multiple occasions.

We inquired with the Polish Ministry of Defense for specifics about these statements—when exactly did the Kaliningrad warhead count increase, and to what extent? How and when were they upgraded? The Ministry confirmed that, in recent years, nine ships capable of carrying Kalibr-NK missiles with nuclear warheads were stationed at Kaliningrad ports, with two more expected to join in the coming months. Their range is 2,500 km.

The Russian brigade stationed at Chernyakhovsk—just under two hours from Poland’s Grzechotki border—also operates the Iskander missile system. This brigade, which is part of the 4th Naval Aviation Regiment, has twelve launchers capable of carrying warheads ranging between 500 and 2,500 km, depending on missile type. The brigade consists of three battalions and houses 48 missiles. According to Lithuanian intelligence, Russia recently relocated some missile systems from Kaliningrad to Rostov-on-Don.

The Su-24M bombers stationed in Chernyakhovsk have been replaced by modern Su-30SM multirole aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Satellite images reveal that the 4th Naval Aviation Regiment base is fortified by two anti-air defense units. Analysis by OSINT for Ukraine indicates that the base currently hosts 13 Su-24M fighters, with no visible Su-30SMs. Five km south of the base, we found a site likely used to house radar systems; infrastructure expansion began here last year. Russian forces are likely preparing the area for a “Container 29B6” radar station, capable of detecting targets up to 3,000 km away.

Ready for the First Strike

“The ‘Container’ system is a strategic early-warning radar,” explains Konrad Muzyka, a Polish OSINT analyst and founder of Rochan Consulting, which specializes in tracking Russian military positions. “It monitors ballistic missiles aimed at Russia—threats that could signal the start of a larger war. Its purpose is to safeguard Russia’s radar intelligence from being neutralized before missile strikes on other targets.”

Russia is likely expanding radar coverage to better monitor European airspace. Currently, the system only operates in Mordovia, monitoring Ukraine’s airspace. Since 2022, Ukrainian drones have twice attacked this “Container” radar equipment.

In late July this year, Putin announced that Russia was finishing work on an upgraded version of its Iskander missiles, now with a range of up to 1,000 km—500 km more than the previous versions, which were limited by international treaties. When asked about the Iskanders, the Polish Ministry of Defense responded: “NATO is actively involved in actions aimed at neutralizing these threats. However, these activities are classified, and we cannot disclose further details.”

How large is Russia’s nuclear arsenal right near Poland’s border? According to Poland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs press office: “Open sources, like the SIPRI Yearbook 2024, estimate Russia’s tactical nuclear arsenal at between 1,500 and 2,000 warheads. Some are believed to be stationed in Kaliningrad.”

Experts emphasize that Russia’s statements about the Iskanders are partly psychological warfare. “Iskanders have been in Kaliningrad long before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and they’re only as dangerous as Russia’s actual willingness to use them. Russia creates fear-driven scenarios here and tests responses, like when it violates NATO airspace,” says Maciej Matysiak, a former deputy head of Poland’s Military Counterintelligence Service.

What if Russia launches a missile strike? Andrzej Wilk, senior specialist on the military aspects of international security at the Polish Center for Eastern Studies (OSW), comments: “We have interceptors capable of neutralizing both Iskander and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Whether they carry nuclear payloads is irrelevant. We’re in the process of establishing a multi-layered air defense system. If we meet our objectives, Europe will have no stronger missile shield than ours. But the question remains—will the enemy’s capabilities surpass our defenses? To repel a massive attack, we need sufficient interceptor numbers.”

Wilk admits that even the best missile defenses can fall short when targets are nearby. “The key to stopping Iskanders is taking out the launch sites before they can fire. NATO has ample forces to immediately dismantle systems in Kaliningrad,” he says.

General Ben Hodges, former U.S. Army commander in Europe, speaking with Eesti Ekspress, stresses that in the event of conflict, a swift and powerful NATO strike on Kaliningrad is certain. However, military readiness alone isn’t enough; any attack on Russian territory, even in defense of a NATO member, requires unified political approval within the Alliance.

This Is the “Deafen and Blind” Tactic

At the end of April, Finnair suspended flights between Helsinki and Tartu, Estonia. The reason? Repeated GPS disruptions, coinciding with Russian navy exercises focused on counter-drone tactics. Due to GPS interference, a civilian aircraft en route from Helsinki to Tartu was forced to return. In March, an RAF plane returning from Poland with British Defense Secretary Grant Shapps on board lost GPS signal for half an hour; the British government confirmed this happened near Kaliningrad. (VSquare, Delfi and LRT have already reported about the signals and electronic intelligence capabilities of Russian outposts .)

Increasingly frequent and, as our sources in the Polish government and intelligence services report, increasingly disruptive GPS interference from the Kaliningrad region is part of Russia’s hybrid warfare. Piotr Żochowski from the Center for Eastern Studies recalls: “I recently drove up to the Russian border, where I received only a Russian signal and experienced connection issues. GPS interference here is a form of military sabotage.”

When asked about GPS disruptions, Polish intelligence sources confirm that “It’s been intensifying in recent months. The reason could be either drills and testing of GPS-jamming systems aimed at disrupting drones or a form of hybrid warfare—a mere provocation.”

In January, the U.S.-based Institute for the Study of War published an analysis on GPS disruptions in Poland and the Baltic region. Swedish authorities launched an investigation, suspecting that these disruptions were linked to Russian naval exercises. Dutch MEPs from the Renew group have also demanded an investigation into GPS disruptions from Kaliningrad, proposing an EU center to study such attacks. The European Commission responded that it’s a member state responsibility.

An investigative report by Mediazona, citing OSINT researchers, suggests the so-called “Baltic Jammer” —a system capable of severely disrupting Western navigation systems – operates from the Kaliningrad region.

The Polish Ministry of Defense confirmed to Frontstory.pl incidents of signal interference around Kaliningrad: “Incidents intensified in 2024. Radio-electronic emissions from that direction are being received and analyzed by Polish Armed Forces units and NATO resources assigned to this task.” The Ministry emphasizes that these disruptions don’t threaten military or civilian aircraft, which use alternate navigation methods.

Besides training saboteurs and disrupting GPS, the Kremlin is reportedly attempting to establish an influence operations center (or “info-ops”) in Kaliningrad. This is known from leaked documents from the Russian Social Design Agency (SDA), revealed by Delfi Estonia, VSquare and partners in September. SDA has considered setting up a unit focused on the Baltic states, Poland, and Germany in Kaliningrad.

The leaked SDA document states: “Thanks to its geographical location and historical cultural ties with Europe, Kaliningrad Oblast is the most convenient springboard for organizing and conducting information operations in EU countries.” Target objectives include promoting Russian narratives, influencing political and economic decisions, election processes, and creating a network of allies while advancing Russia’s agenda in media and social networks.

Iskander launcher, source: Vitaly V. Kuzmin, Wikimedia Commons

Nuclear Threats from Belarus

Kaliningrad is strategically critical should Russia attack the Baltic states. Putin’s TV propagandists already regularly threaten Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia with invasion under the pretext of defending Russian minorities. Putin has recently insisted that Russia must ensure “unimpeded access” between mainland Russia and Kaliningrad. If Russia were to attack the Baltic countries, one goal would be to cut them off from support through Poland by controlling the so-called Suwalki Gap, a roughly 65 km corridor at the Polish-Lithuanian border, squeezed between Kaliningrad and Belarus. During a conflict, NATO allies would need to use these roads and railways to support the Baltic states.

Andrzej Wilk from the Center for Eastern Studies explains: “The Suwalki Gap would fall within range of Russian fire from both sides. NATO forces would first need to neutralize Kaliningrad and Belarus’s capabilities.”

What does this entail? Wilk says “capabilities” include missile systems stationed in Kaliningrad and Russian artillery units stationed at a central Belarusian base near Asipovichi. If the Suwalki Gap were attacked, these assets could be moved near Poland. Nuclear warheads for Iskanders are reportedly stored there. Russian media claimed that a high-ranking official from the Ministry of Defense inspected Asipovichi in 2023 for its suitability for nuclear storage. 

Satellite imagery indicates that infrastructure expansion in Asipovichi indeed began around 2023, including a probable garage for Iskander launchers, with work ongoing on new facilities.

There is also no doubt in Lithuania and Poland that the Belarusian military is an integrated part of the Russian military. (The unification of the military command line is one of Russia’s strategic goals in Belarus). They have been taking part in joint military exercises along NATO borders for years. It is known, for example, that in the Zapad21 exercise, Russian and Belarusian units trained to occupy the Kazlų Rūda training ground. The exercise involved, from the Kaliningrad side, the 45th Special Purpose Airborne Reconnaissance Brigade, the 336th Marine Brigade, 390 Reconnaissance Point Diversionaries and, from the Belarusian side, the 5th Separate Special Purpose Brigade deployed at Maryina Gorka in the Vitebsk Region. 

A couple of kilometers from Kaliningrad’s borders with Poland and Lithuania, near Grodno, Belarus has two military bases. The 6th Mechanized Brigade of the Belarusian Army, equipped with T-72B tanks, is stationed there, able to reach the Suwalki Gap within a day. Since last year, around one hundred Wagner Group mercenaries have also been stationed near Grodno, reportedly supporting hybrid attacks on Poland, equipping migrants with pepper spray and knives for border crossings. “The Wagner group coordinates with Belarusian operational troops, not the regular army. They train them in tactics. Wagner also participated in regular army exercises at the start of the war and in artillery drills, though we haven’t seen recent cases,” says Konrad Muzyka.

Additionally, 40 km from the Lithuanian border lies the Lida military airfield. It is another important military facility for Belarusian and Russian forces. According to LRT sources, the Belarusian armed forces are actively preparing to counter the threat from the West and ensure the survival of the Minsk regime. For example, in April last year, the Belarusian defense ministry released a short video of an Su-25 pilot explaining his new role after training in Russia. According to analysts, the images in the video suggest that the Lida air base has become the new site of “nuclear sharing” between Russia and Belarus—that is, Belarusian fighter jets could be adapted to carry nuclear weapons. 

Currently, Lida is the base of the 116th Air Assault Guard of the Belarusian Air Force, where Su-25 fighters are deployed. This base was reportedly used to attack Ukraine. 

In late September, the Belarusian Armed Forces launched a new round of inspections of military units. The inspections are meant to assess the readiness and capability of air forces and air defense units to perform their assigned tasks. This announcement by the Belarusian Ministry of Defence came days after Alexander Lukashenko had commented to the media that although he did not want to go to war, he had to prepare for war. 

Analysis of public sources shows that a new unit, the 62nd Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment, began being formed at the Grodno military base in Belarus in September. According to analysts, this may be linked to new operational teams that have been in formation since 2022. 

Belarusian Hajun, a group that monitors military activity in Belarus, notes that every airfield, including Lida, is home to units of the Russian Armed Forces’ anti-aircraft missile regiment. This regiment was redeployed to Belarus during the 2022 exercise. Russian troop rotations were also observed in 2023 and 2024.

And yet, according to analysts, the question of how the Belarusian army could participate if Russia decided to attack NATO remains unanswered. Even a recent simulation of a war with Russia, presented a few weeks ago by retired US generals, envisaged Belarusian forces as playing only a disruptive role, according to Lithuanian retired colonel Gintaras Ažubalis.

Russian Bases Close to Estonia Seem Empty

Further up north, close to Russia’s border with Estonia, satellite images reveal that many Russian military bases are now significantly emptier than they were a few years ago. Comparing satellite photos over time, our partner Eesti Ekspress has identified that much of the equipment previously stored outdoors has vanished.

Where there were once hundreds of tanks, armored personnel carriers, command vehicles, and Kamaz trucks parked in tight rows, today we see mostly empty ground. It can’t be confirmed that all this equipment has been sent to Ukraine, as some may be in garages or relocated to other units. Notably, the parking lots—once filled with the private cars of military contractors—are nowadays often considerably less crowded.

This reduction is clearly visible at the Pskov military airfield, just 35 km from the Estonian border. This is where the notorious 76th Air Assault Division and the 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade—rapid response units that would be deployed first to capture critical targets, including leaders and other high-profile individuals, in the event of an invasion—are based.

Colonel Ants Kiviselg, head of the Estonian Defense Forces’ Intelligence Center, notes that, if Putin were to attack Estonia to pressure NATO, the likely mission for the 76th and 2nd Spetsnaz would be to seize a key site or a military base to demonstrate superiority. “They might also attempt to disrupt communications and data centers or even target VIPs, as seen with kill lists in Ukraine,” he adds.

In the event of a full-scale attempt to occupy Estonia, these units could also be deployed to capture airfields or other strategic sites to establish Russian air defenses there.

In June this year, Planet Labs captured satellite images showing the runway at the Pskov base still scarred from the August 29, 2022 drone attack launched by Ukraine from over 700 km away. This attack destroyed two Il-76 transport planes and damaged two others, forcing Russia to relocate its remaining aircraft farther east.

This drone attack also impacted the division’s training routine. Since realizing that even Pskov is within Ukraine’s reach, Russian conscripts are now required to patrol the base—a task that reduces time for practical training.

The strike on Pskov carried symbolic significance for Ukraine: on February 24, 2022, 18 Il-76 planes took off from Pskov carrying elite paratroopers aiming to capture Hostomel Airport near Kyiv. The attack was thwarted thanks to Ukrainian resistance and a tip-off from Estonian military intelligence. Units from Russia’s 76th Division were later deployed to Belarus. This failure played a significant role in preventing the capture of Kyiv.

The unit suffered heavy losses in the subsequent months. According to Estonian military intelligence, the combat capacity at the Pskov base has now been reduced to about 30 percent.

Will Russia Attack—and When?

Recently retired top commanders in Estonia’s Defense Forces—Martin Herem, Veiko-Vello Palm, and Jüri Saska—agree that the full-scale annexation of the Baltic states is unlikely. “I don’t think Russia will attack Estonia tomorrow,” retired General Ben Hodges told Eesti Ekspress, adding, “at least not in the traditional sense.” Nevertheless, he considers the Russian threat against Estonia and the other Baltic states to be very real, not hypothetical.

Polish analyst Andrzej Wilk also says that Russia won’t attack NATO—as long as NATO remains strong enough to repel it. Russia would require a favorable geopolitical climate, as an attack on a NATO country would trigger a global war on a scale far larger than the conflict in Ukraine.

Konrad Muzyka, too, remains confident in NATO’s security. He notes that nearly all Russian military production is consumed by the war in Ukraine, and most of the ground forces from Kaliningrad are already on the front lines. “As long as the U.S. is part of NATO and not preoccupied in Asia, we’re secure—even if Ukraine falls and Russia takes half of it. Russia will emerge from this war significantly weakened, especially its ground forces.”

More concerning scenarios would see the U.S. occupied by conflict in the Pacific. Muzyka notes that, under NATO’s defense doctrine, air superiority would be key in conflict. “We’ll neutralize Russian air defenses and won’t need massive artillery; our aircraft are precise enough to destroy enemy ground forces,” Muzyka says.

But what if U.S. air forces are engaged elsewhere, like in a military conflict between China and Taiwan? Muzyka concludes: “In that case, we’d be in a very difficult position.”

Lithuanian-Russian border. Source: Lithuanian Ministry of Defense

More Likely: Hybrid War Escalation

General Ben Hodges has no doubts, “The Russians are already clearly at war with us, even if we don’t recognize it,” he says, citing examples like the severing of undersea cables, acts of sabotage across Europe, airspace violations, cyberattacks and hacking. Russia uses such operations to test the West’s reactions. “And each time we fail to respond when a Russian missile or drone crosses Polish or Romanian airspace, it emboldens them,” Hodges explains.

Politicians from the Polish government coalition acknowledge that the instrumentalization of migration at the Belarus border is also part of Russia’s hybrid warfare campaign (this was investigated by Frontstory.pl back in December 2021). “Our intelligence, although I can’t disclose all the details, has no doubts about it being a Russian operation. We could track the entire process of motivating people in Afghanistan and other countries, transporting them to certain European countries, and then moving them to Belarus. This is a new generation of warfare, a relatively low-cost instrument. Poland is forced to spend money on building fences and investing in the border policing mission,” said General Rajmund Andrzejczak, former Chief of the Polish Armed Forces General Staff, in an August interview with Baltic Sentinel.

The Polish Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs report that hybrid actions have escalated since early 2024: “Russia’s actions are increasingly aggressive and resemble, in fact, terrorist activities.” It lists acts of sabotage (arson, cyber-attacks), migration manipulation and GPS signal interference as examples.

“This intensified Russian hybrid assault on EU/NATO territories is not only a tactic to pressure states to curb their support for Ukraine but also evidence of Russia’s hostile policy toward the West,” the Polish foreign ministry replied to our request for comment.

This year, the Kremlin intends to allocate 10.4 trillion rubles (€98 billion) for the war effort—mid-year, military spending for next year was raised by one-fourth to 13.2 trillion rubles (€127 billion). Exactly how these funds will be used remains unclear, as 85 percent of military expenditures are classified. “The increase in Russia’s defense spending suggests they expect the war to last beyond next year,” Colonel Ants Kiviselg, head of Estonian military intelligence, told Eesti Ekspress, our partner outlet. “Whether it will continue in Ukraine or another region is another question. The Russian Federation is certainly preparing.”

Tamara Kaňuchová (VSquare) contributed to this article.

This story is a part of “Eyes on Russia” project, financed by the Investigative Journalism For EU (IJ4EU).