Part 2: Olenivka: From Captivity to Being Burned to Death

“If it’s true, then why was such a bad act committed?” “To destroy you.”

Investigators: Vyacheslav Kolomeets

Authors: Margot V.H., Madelief A., Olya, A.P., Manon-Catherine Balbinot

Edited by: Orlaith Delaney

Introduction

On the evening of 28 July 2022, a barrack situated within the Olenivka Correctional Colony in Molodizhne, near Olenivka, Donetsk Oblast, suffered significant destruction, resulting in the loss of life or injury to 193 individuals classified as prisoners of war (PoWs). These 193 PoWs, admitted to the Olenivka Correctional Colony between April and May 2022, purportedly experienced torture and ill-treatment. During the night of 28 July, the aforementioned PoWs were inside the barracks, which were reportedly subjected to bombing by forces affiliated with the Russian government. Following the explosion, the affected PoWs were not promptly provided with medical assistance, resulting in fatalities and physical injuries. These actions potentially constitute violations of international law, specifically Article 8(2)(a)(ii) of the Rome Statute and relevant provisions of the Third Geneva Convention (GC III), and contravene the provisions outlined in the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), as well as pertinent international, European, and domestic human rights statutes.

Following the incident, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs directly petitioned the International Criminal Court (ICC) to undertake an inquiry into the explosion at the Olenivka Prison, alleging that the events of 29 July 2022 involved commission of war crimes. Furthermore, Antonio Guterres, secretary-general of the United Nations, initiated a fact-finding mission, albeit subsequently dissolving it due to perceived inadequacies in the conditions necessary for its deployment to the site. Although the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were denied access to the location, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) disclosed that it had conducted comprehensive interviews with survivors of the Olenivka incident and engaged in meticulous analysis of available supplementary data, adhering to established OHCHR protocols.

Since August 2022, notwithstanding the ongoing inquiry by the Ukrainian prosecutor-general, relatives of the victims have tried to raise awareness and seek justice for the 29 July explosion within the international community. Upon their request, OSINT FOR UKRAINE undertook an investigation to shed light on the events surrounding the Olenivka incident. This part of our investigation delineates the legal framework concerning potential breaches of international, regional, and domestic law concerning the deliberate explosion of the barracks housing the 193 PoWs and the ill-treatment they were subjected to in the period preceding the explosion.

Legal Framework

Torture as a war crime

The GC III establishes the legal framework governing the treatment of PoWs during their detention. Pursuant to Article 13 of GC III, PoWs are to be treated with utmost humanity at all times. Any act or omission by the detaining authority that results in the death or poses serious threats to the health of a PoW under its custody is strictly prohibited. Such actions shall be deemed as grave violations of the Convention. It is imperative to note that even entities not party to the GC III are bound by the prohibition against maltreatment of PoWs, as enshrined in customary humanitarian law, specifically prohibiting torture, cruel or inhuman treatment as well as outrages upon personal dignity.

Violations of humanitarian law are subject to prosecution under international criminal law. Article 8(2)(a)(ii) of the Rome Statute explicitly addresses acts of torture or inhuman treatment perpetrated within the context of an international armed conflict as constituting war crimes. To establish the commission of the war crime of torture, the following criteria must be met as delineated in the Elements of Crimes of the ICC: 

1. The perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon one or more persons.

2. The perpetrator inflicted the pain or suffering for such purposes as: obtaining information or a confession, punishment, intimidation or coercion or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.

3. Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

4. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.

5. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

6. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Torture is distinguished from other offenses by the severity of pain and suffering inflicted. However, no precise threshold level has been identified, as torture can manifest in various forms. International criminal tribunals have recognized acts such as beatings, sexual violence, prolonged deprivation of sleep, food, hygiene, and/or medical assistance as likely constituting torture. Notably, the scope of such conduct extends beyond physical harm to encompass mental suffering as a form of torture. Examples of mental torture include being compelled to witness severe mistreatment inflicted on a relative, threats of death causing severe mental anguish, and forcing protected persons to handle the deceased bodies of other members of their ethnic group. 

Qualification of acts or omissions as torture occurs on case-by-case basis. While conducting the assessment, the relevant tribunal might take into consideration, for instance: (i) the premeditated and institutionalised nature of the ill-treatment; (ii) the extent to which an individual has been mistreated over a prolonged period of time; and (iii) whether the victim has been subjected to repeated or various forms of mistreatment that are interrelated, follow a pattern, or are directed towards the same prohibited goal, in which case the severity of the acts should be assessed as a whole.

Acts failing to meet the requisite threshold of suffering or pain may be categorised as cruel or inhuman treatment instead. The Rome Statute does not require the perpetrator to hold an official position. The element of intent (specifically elements 4 and 6) will be further explored in subsequent parts of this investigation.

Torture as a violation of human rights

International human rights treaties

The CAT defines torture as the deliberate infliction of severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon an individual. Such acts are carried out, instigated, or implicitly condoned by a public official or another person acting in an official capacity.

Unlike the Rome Statute, which addresses individual accountability, the CAT imposes obligations solely upon State Parties. Each State Party is mandated to prevent instances of torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, even if they do not meet the threshold of torture. This prevention is to be achieved through the adequate education and training of civilian or military law enforcement personnel and other relevant individuals involved in the apprehension, interrogation, or custody of individuals under any form of arrest, detention, or imprisonment. In cases where there is reasonable suspicion of torture committed within its jurisdiction, a State Party is required to conduct a swift and impartial investigation.

The CAT unequivocally prohibits the invocation of exceptional circumstances, such as armed conflict, imminent war, internal political unrest, or any other public emergency, as justification for torture. Likewise, orders from superiors or public authorities do not absolve individuals of acts constituting torture. Furthermore, as the prohibition of torture represents a peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens), its non-derogability is not contingent upon treaty obligations; each State is perpetually bound to prevent and prosecute instances of torture, regardless of its status as a signatory to the CAT. Lastly, the Mandela Rules, adopted by the United Nations, emphasise humane treatment for all prisoners, including those designated as PoWs. They prohibit any form of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, stressing the dignity and rights of all individuals deprived of their liberty. Beatings are unequivocally condemned as acts of torture under these rules, reflecting a commitment to uphold human rights standards in all circumstances, even in conflict situations.

Regional human rights treaties

At the regional level, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) expressly prohibits the practice of torture under its Article 3. Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is vested with the authority to adjudicate complaints related to instances of torture that violate the provisions of the Convention. Notably, the ECtHR has determined that actions such as severe physical assaults leading to the death of individuals at the hands of law enforcement officers, prolonged detention under substandard conditions, and the imposition of excessive physical exertion on individuals with health impairments constitute infringements of Article 3 of the ECHR. Article 3 of the ECHR is complemented by the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which establishes a Committee for the Prevention of Torture. This committee is empowered to conduct visits to any place of detention within the territories of member states of the Council of Europe to prevent instances of torture.

Numerous international instruments also establish additional benchmarks for the treatment of prisoners and detainees. For instance, the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners outlines minimum standards concerning accommodation, medical care, and hygiene for prisoners. Additionally, these rules underscore the obligation of medical personnel to promptly notify authorities and gather evidence in cases of torture or ill-treatment.

Torture as crime under Ukrainian national law 

Torture not only contravenes international law but is also prohibited under Ukrainian criminal statutes. Article 438 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code pertains specifically to breaches of the laws of armed conflict. Pursuant to this provision, any transgression of the laws of armed conflict as stipulated by international agreements ratified by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, which includes the infliction of cruel treatment upon prisoners of war or civilians, is subject to imprisonment for a period ranging from eight to 12 years. Additionally, acts involving premeditated murder are punishable by imprisonment for a term of ten to 15 years or life imprisonment. Liability for this offence extends to both the commission of the prohibited acts and the issuance of orders to carry out such actions.

Victims of torture at Olenivka

Definition of PoWs 

Article 4 of the GC III outlines the criteria for individuals to be considered PoWs. According to this provision, PoWs include members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. Additionally, individuals who accompany the armed forces without actually being members, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, are also classified as PoWs if they fall into enemy hands. Furthermore, inhabitants of a non-occupied territory who spontaneously take up arms to resist invading forces without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units are considered PoWs. Lastly, members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or authority not recognized by the detaining power are also covered under the definition of PoWs. These categories ensure that individuals who engage in armed conflict within the scope of the Geneva Conventions are afforded the protections and rights stipulated therein. 

PoWs at Olenivka Prison

A significant number of detainees at Olenivka belonged to the forces engaged in the defence of Azovstal, Mariupol. They may fall within the classification of “members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict”. This designation is derived from their association with the Azov Regiment, a component of Ukraine’s National Guard, in addition to their participation in the 36th Special Marine Brigade of Ukraine’s Naval Forces and the 12th Brigade of the National Guard. Furthermore, the siege of Mariupol and the subsequent occupation of the city by the Russian armed forces took place in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which has been legally categorized as an international armed conflict. This demonstrates a connection between the actions of the Russian prison administration and the international armed conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Consequently, the third and fifth contextual elements outlined in the definition of torture as a war crime under Article 8(2)(a)(ii) of the Rome Statute are satisfied.

Evidence of cruel treatment and torture prior to the explosion
Physical elements of torture

In its report dated 5 March 2024, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine affirms the prevalence of torture practices. The Commission conducted investigations into incidents of torture spanning 11 distinct detention facilities, seven situated within regions under Russian jurisdiction within Ukrainian territory and four within the Russian Federation. The Commission posits that Russian authorities have employed torture, alongside other forms of maltreatment, with the intent of punishment and coercion across various detention centers under Russian control, thus indicating a systematic pattern. Terms such as “widespread” and “systematic” are indicative of crimes against humanity, encompassing acts perpetrated within a widespread or systematic assault targeting civilian populations. However, as the scope of this investigation primarily pertains to PoWs and their treatment within the Olenivka Correctional Colony, the subsequent legal analysis will confine itself to acts of torture as war crimes.

Below, facts of different acts of torture and ill-treatment are discussed, such as beatings, lack of medical treatment and sanitary conditions, forced labour and forced singing. For each different form of torture, the relevant rules and jurisprudence are explained, followed by an assessment of the facts to determine whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that these acts have been committed at Olenivka Correctional Colony.

Evidence of beatings and killings

The evidence compiled by OSINT FOR UKRAINE indicates that individuals responsible for detainment subjected one or more detainees to severe physical and/or mental anguish. Reports received by the OHCHR suggest that some groups of PoWs newly transferred to Olenivka were subjected to what were described as “welcome beatings” by guards associated with Russian forces. While these beatings generally avoided vital organs, there have been five documented fatalities among male PoWs.

In a specific instance, it has been reported to the OHCHR by seven PoWs that an individual serving in the Azov Regiment of National Guard Unit 3057 was fatally assaulted by guards affiliated with Russian-associated armed groups within a disciplinary segregation unit of the penal facility near Olenivka. Female PoWs confined in the same facility witnessed the removal of his body from the premises on either 3 or 4 July 2022.

Source: AP/The Independent, 21 August 2022.

Likewise, the Media Initiative for Human Rights (MIHR) received accounts from civilian detainees indicating that in Olenivka, instances of torture, including physical assaults, were more prevalent against former combatants. This occurred primarily within the Disciplinary Isolation Unit (DISO or DIZO), which was picked as the designated building to torture PoWs after the arrival of the Azovstal detainees in May 2022. 

“After hundreds of Azov fighters arrived, they shifted the torture rooms to DISO. We were told they would beat them using guns, their legs, wooden sticks and metal rods. Whatever they had to hand,” Oleksiy adds.

“Physical force at that point was only used in the disciplinary isolation ward as a punishment for violating rules. But we were under constant moral pressure.”

Recollections from detainees point to a particular room on the first floor where captured military personnel were subjected to torment, often accompanied by the blaring of loud music to silence the agonised cries of those being abused. A former detainee recollects that upon arrival in Olenivka, individuals associated with Azovstal were subjected to prolonged periods of forced squatting, physical assaults, and verbal abuse by prison guards, resulting in psychological distress.

“[w]hen [the Azovstal detainees] arrived [in Olenivka], [they] were forced to sit in a squat position for hours. Some prisoners were beaten. [Prison guards] searched us, stripped us naked and yelled at us. It was psychological torture.”

“I also remember one episode from that time [April 2022]. New captured servicemen were brought to the colony. They started to beat them. The guards turned on the radio for the entire prison and at that moment these prisoners were beaten.”  

Anton Shtukin, a former PoW and member of the Azov regiment, who endured captivity for an extended period, recounted in an interview the severe beatings he sustained, resulting in extensive bruising and numerous injuries following interrogations. He further asserted that all statements obtained in Olenivka were coerced through torture. Another former PoW, a serviceman from the 36th Special Marine Brigade of Ukraine's Naval Forces who was held captive across various facilities for 15 months, disclosed in an interview the exceedingly harsh treatment meted out by personnel from the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), including instances where four individuals were killed. He said one male detainee, already injured, succumbed to fatal injuries inflicted during an assault by inebriated DPR personnel, exacerbating pre-existing wounds, including a shrapnel fragment lodged near his heart. The interviewed detainee also highlighted the routine use of abusive tactics during interrogations, which frequently involved physical violence.

Additionally, Dr. Y., a military physician detained in Olenivka, attested that a wounded PoW, who had endured two airstrikes and suffered facial burns, was fatally beaten. The testimonies collectively depict a pattern of systemic physical violence and abuse within the Russian-operated Olenivka Correctional Colony No. 120 in Donetsk Oblast, as recounted by Dr. Y., during his incarceration.

“There was constant physical violence. There was a guy with a crutch; they took the crutch from him and beat him with it, even as he fell to the ground. A wounded prisoner of war, who survived two airstrikes and had facial burns, was beaten to death.”

Reports from numerous witnesses corroborate the use of torture as a means of punishment and intimidation. Anna Vorosheva, a released civilian detainee, described the atmosphere within the facility as one characterised by demonstrations of power, where detainees were frequently subjected to derogatory labels and verbal abuse. Additionally, Vorosheva recounted instances of pro-separatist guards openly discussing plans to mistreat and degrade Azov prisoners upon their arrival. 

“It was a demonstration of power.” 

“[Detainees] were frequently called Nazis and terrorists. One of the women in my cell was an Azovstal medic. She was pregnant. I asked if I could give her my food ration. I was told, ‘No, she’s a killer’. The only question they ever asked me was, ‘Do you know any Azov soldiers?’”

 “[T]hey talked openly about how they were going to brutalise and humiliate [Azov prisoners of war].”

Legal Framework

According to international law, beatings inflicted upon PoWs are deemed acts of torture, prohibited by various treaties and conventions. The CAT and Article 17 of the GC III provide comprehensive protection for PoWs, explicitly mentioning acts causing severe pain or suffering, such as beatings, as prohibited. Additionally, the Mandela Rules and Article 3 of the ECHR prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, categorically prohibiting beatings against PoWs. 

International criminal law also recognizes acts of beatings against PoWs as torture. The Rome Statute of the ICC and the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) define torture and classify beatings as grave breaches of international humanitarian law. Landmark judgments from these tribunals have consistently established beatings as torture, holding perpetrators accountable for violating fundamental human rights and humanitarian principles. For instance, the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Delić found that  “[…] during their detention at Kamenica Camp, [PoWs] were routinely subjected [...] to acts amounting to serious mental and physical suffering, including beatings, as well as the infliction of electric shocks” with wires attached to a car battery, stomped on and hit with shovels, pieces of iron and police batons by members of the “El Mujahed” Detachment (EMD). The Trial Chamber thus concluded that the Prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt the elements of cruel treatment and torture as a violation of the laws or customs of war. 

Various other judgments emphasized that torture encompasses not only severe physical pain or suffering inflicted intentionally, but also requires the acts to be committed for specific purposes, such as obtaining information, coercion, punishment, or discrimination. The tribunals established that the deliberate infliction of beatings upon prisoners for one of the aforementioned purposes constituted a grave violation of fundamental human rights and humanitarian principles.

Analysis

The facts provided above outline a disturbing pattern of systematic physical and mental abuse perpetrated against detainees, particularly those associated with the Azov Regiment, within the Olenivka Correctional Colony No. 120 in Donetsk Oblast. These beatings, as described, unequivocally amount to torture under international legal frameworks. The legal framework provided encompasses various international agreements and statutes designed to protect individuals, particularly PoWs, from torture and other forms of inhumane treatment. These instruments collectively prohibit torture and establish standards for the humane treatment of detainees, including PoWs.

The actions described in the facts presented, including severe physical assaults, beatings, prolonged periods of forced squatting, verbal abuse, and psychological torment, meet the threshold for torture as defined by international law. These acts cause severe physical and mental suffering, aimed at punishing, intimidating, coercing, or discriminating against the detainees. The victims of these acts, including PoWs and civilian detainees, are explicitly protected under the Geneva Conventions and other relevant international instruments. The deliberate targeting of individuals based on their affiliation with the Azov Regiment constitutes discrimination and violates their protected status under international humanitarian law.

Furthermore, the perpetrators of these acts, including guards associated with Russian forces and armed groups, are aware of the protected status of the victims and the existence of an armed conflict. The context of an international armed conflict further establishes the gravity of the offences and the applicability of international humanitarian law. The actions described, including beatings against PoWs, constitute war crimes under Article 8(2)(a)(ii) of the Rome Statute. The Elements of Crimes of the ICC outline the criteria for establishing the commission of torture as a war crime, all of which are met based on the facts provided. Previous judgments from international criminal tribunals, such as the ICC, ICTY, and ICTR, have consistently recognized beatings as torture and have held perpetrators accountable for such actions. The case law supports the classification of these acts as grave breaches of international humanitarian law, warranting prosecution and accountability.

In summary, the facts presented demonstrate clear violations of international law, including prohibitions against torture and inhumane treatment, as outlined in various treaties and conventions. The legal framework provided offers a basis for the prosecution of perpetrators responsible for these egregious crimes, ensuring accountability for grave breaches of human rights and humanitarian principles.

No access to medical treatment

Facts

The perpetrators did not solely inflict physical and/or mental harm upon detainees, but also let detainees suffer by withholding access to medical care. The OHCHR documented “the death of four wounded or sick PoWs due to lack of proper medical attention. In the summer of 2022, a PoW died in a penal colony near Olenivka due to lack of treatment for hepatitis.” Yevgeny Maliarchuk, a former civilian detainee, told a news outlet that “only imprisoned Ukrainian doctors treated Olenivka prisoners. There was a lack of medicines.” Medical personnel held captive in Olenivka “witnessed many people dying as a result of insufficient medical supplies, lack of sanitary conditions, refusal to evacuate patients to the hospital, and extreme beatings”. One former civilian detainee believed that she would not be able to withstand the terrible conditions:

“It was impossible. It was freezing in the cell due to constant drafts. All the women got bronchitis, and some became ill because of their age or other chronic diseases.”

Another medical detainee recalled how wounded prisoners were left to die “if the chief was not in the mood” to transfer them to a hospital. The detainees were therefore dependent on the goodwill of the colony’s management to obtain medical assistance and equipment. 

Legal Framework

According to Article 30 of the GC III, every detention camp is required to have an infirmary, and provide medical treatment without adverse distinction and with the least possible delay. Moreover, PoWs whose condition necessitates special treatment, a surgical operation or hospital care must be admitted to any military or civilian medical unit where such treatment can be given. The Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Kvočka found that “some responsibility for this lack of medical attention” may fall on the guards who are tasked with the selection of detainees in need of treatment. Absence of medical care after abuse in combination with “the nature, purpose, consistency, and severity” of other forms of abuse also constitutes indicia of torture. Furthermore, the ECtHR has previously found that in-prison medical treatment that falls short in comparison with the conditions enjoyed by patients in the outside community constitutes a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR. 

Analysis

In 2020, the Olenivka Correctional Colony had an operating medical unit employing around 13 specialists with a capacity of 11 beds, and a pharmacy with more than 140 different items. Nonetheless, the prison management failed to provide medical treatment to seriously ill detainees with the least possible delay, if at all. The refusal to address the medical needs of the detainees is therefore a violation of the laws of war, in particular Article 30 of GC III. The examples above qualify as acts of inhuman treatment at the very least, as is also argued by Insecurity Insight. Considering that in a few instances the absence of medical care led to significant levels of suffering and even death, these failures may qualify as acts of torture within the meaning of Article 8(2)(a)(ii) of the Rome Statute.

Lack of nutrition and bad hygienic conditions

Facts

Most PoWs reported “significant weight loss due to [the] dire conditions” in the colony. One former detainee said the following about this: 

“[T]he DISO provided only 200 millilitres of water per person and a loaf of bread for eight persons per day. There is no centralised water supply in the [DISO] – water was brought in canisters. Sometimes, chow servers [prisoners who dispensed food] were allowed here. Food is a liquid with five to six pieces of undercooked potatoes and pickled cabbage. Such ‘soup’ was prepared in a field kitchen, there were no other facilities used for this purpose.” 

Aside from the lack of food and the irregularity of food distribution, the OHCHR noted that there was a particularly severe issue in the penal colony near Olenivka and a pre-trial detention centre (“SIZO” or “СИЗО” in Ukrainian) in Donetsk with PoWs receiving only limited amounts of drinking water or, alternately, dirty water with insects. 

In general, conditions for PoWs in detention facilities in the occupied territories did not meet standards as reported by the OHCHR. The conditions at Olenivka specifically were deemed unsatisfactory by the OHCHR stating that hygiene and sanitary conditions were poor. Additionally, the overall conditions were worsened by the lack of beds and space in the barracks where the detainees were held. An account from a female PoW at Olenivka described that she was detained in a cell “designed for 6 people [but there] were 27 women already there”. A male witness also recounted a lack of space, especially for PoWs that were housed on the first floor with around 200 PoWs. The witness himself was housed with 22 other civilians on the second floor of the barracks. This account has been corroborated by other detainees. The sanitary conditions in Olenivka were also substandard for female detainees, both civilian and PoWs, as most women were not given any female hygiene products. One victim recalled “some of us had to go through 3-4 menstrual cycles without these means. It was a separate torture, you can’t call it anything else” and the general conditions at the Olenivka detention centre were described as “[being] surrounded by dirt, decay and [the] piercing cold” and these were the conditions civilian detainees lived in. It is likely that the living conditions for PoWs were even more severe.

Legal Framework

Under the first sentence of Article 22(1) of GC III, the Detaining Power must guarantee that PoWs are interned in camps or detention centres “affording every guarantee of hygiene and healthfulness”. In addition, Article 29 of GC III provides further detail on the obligations of the Detaining Power “to take all sanitary measures necessary to ensure the cleanliness and healthfulness of camps and to prevent epidemics”. Such ‘necessary’ measures are determined on a case-by-case basis taking into account the size of the camp, the number of prisoners interned there, and particular health needs of the PoW population. Additionally, under the second provision of Article 29, separate means should be provided to accommodate female PoWs. Under ECHR Article 3, the conditions of detention should not amount to suffering beyond that of the deprivation of liberty. The detaining authority should ensure that persons are detained in conditions that adequately safeguards the health and wellbeing of the detained. Failure to provide adequate conditions could result in torture, as well as inhuman and/or degrading treatment, which is prohibited under Article 3. As is demonstrated in the case of Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and the Russian Federation, in which the ECtHR found that both the Russian Federation and the Republic of Moldova had breached Article 3 due to the denial of proper food. The court deemed that the first two applicants’ denial of access to food amounted to torture, and that in the cases of two other applicants it amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. 

If one compares Olenivka Correctional Colony and the former prison camp, Omarska, which was located in northern Bosnia and Herzegovina and was run by the Army of the Republika Srpska, one will notice the many similarities between the two detention centres. Four of the five defendants in the Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al. case were charged with torture as a crime against humanity and war crime based on the treatment they inflicted upon Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb detainees in Omarska camp. Based on ICTY jurisprudence as well as findings made by international human rights bodies, the Trial Chamber concluded that the detainees were subjected to “serious humiliating and degrading treatment through such means as inappropriate conditions of confinement in Omarska camp” and that such treatment constituted outrages upon personal dignity within the meaning of Article 3 of the ICTY Statute.

Analysis

Foremost, management at Olenivka did not fulfil their obligations to ensure cleanliness at the detention centre, to take the necessary measures to provide female PoWs with sanitary products or to take into account the health needs of detainees. In line with the aforementioned articles of the GC III, the lack of appropriate conditions as well as the lack of food would be in violation of the laws of war. Additionally, the lack and/or denial of proper food is also in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR, under which the denial of proper food may be classified as torture. The field kitchens preparing the food and water may be considered as unsuitable in light of the number of detainees housed at Olenivka Correctional Colony, as a result of which food was provided for irregularly. The OHCHR also confirmed that detainees were denied access to food, which again under Article 3 of the ECHR may be classified as torture. Taking the Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al. case as an example, management at Olenivka could be held responsible for not fulfilling their obligations by ensuring that the detention facility was meeting standards of cleanliness, even if these individuals were not perpetrating those violations themselves. 

Use of music and forced singing 

Facts

Guards at the Olenivka Correctional Colony purportedly employed music as a means of torture. In Olenivka, guards forced prisoners “to sing [pro-Russian] songs - apparently to ‘re-educate’ them ideologically”, as explained by a former detainee. The National Police of Ukraine reported that some detainees were forced to sing the national anthem of Russia and to shout slogans that were pro-Russian such as “Glory to Russia!” and “The glory of [the] DPR!”. If PoWs did not comply with this daily order, they were beaten by guards. These accounts have been corroborated by a detained doctor who listed being forced to sing “both the [Russian national] anthem and other songs” as acts through which the prison guards imposed constant moral pressure on the prisoners. Additionally, loud music or music at early hours in the day was often used to disturb the prisoners or camouflage the screams and noises associated with physical pain. Lastly, the detainees often arose at six in the morning and were forced to stand in formation and listen to the Russian national anthem. 

Legal Framework

Article 13(2) of GC III comprises an obligation on the Detaining Power to also protect PoWs from “psychological abuse or threat thereof, and encompasses a prohibition on humiliating them”. Although music as an instrument to psychologically abuse detainees is not directly mentioned in the Geneva Conventions or in the CAT, the ICTY has previously determined that forced singing can cause great suffering. For instance, the Trial Chamber in the Prosecutor v. Kvočka case determined that “guards coercing [Muslim and Croat] detainees into singing Serb nationalist songs by withholding water unless the detainees followed orders” was one of many examples of demoralising treatment. One of the defendants, Miroslav Kvočka, also stated that he had observed himself how detainees, who were brought to Omarska camp got off the bus and “were forced to sing Serb nationalistic songs” for the guards’ entertainment.

Analysis

Music as an instrument of torture has been in use since the Second World War, when it was employed in the concentration camps. More recently, the United States applied a technique called ‘no touch torture’ in the context of the War on Terror where they would turn on music during interrogations to create high-stress environments and induce the admission of guilt for offences. ‘No touch torture’ puts a “crucial distance (from the point of view of the torturers) between them and the victim.” This technique was an attempt to sidestep the prohibition on torture and is a direct result of actors experimenting with forms of torture that had not previously been considered as such. The use of music and forced singing could therefore be considered an example of “no touch torture” to humiliate and enforce control over prisoners. 

Former Olenivka detainees have described different uses of music as an instrument of torture, with the most common form seemingly being ‘forced singing’. Grant theorises that the use of forced singing may in part be based on military traditions that were introduced by the French and United States armies during the First World War. The use of music could have been one strategy used by guards at Olenivka to cause great mental suffering as long as forced singing was accompanied by intimidation, coercion or the like.

Forced labour

Facts

Many released prisoners have shared that they were forced to work in the colony without compensation, for instance by renovating the facilities. Mostly civilian detainees were forced to work in the colony with the risk of punishment in the form of beatings and transfer to the DISO if one refused. The MIHR, on the other hand, also heard about detainees who voluntarily worked in the vegetable garden and orchard in order for time to go by faster. Former civilian detainees stated that: “Absolutely all works in the prison were carried out exclusively by prisoners, captives. There were no full-time employees except guards.” As the head of the colony was particularly interested in agriculture, the prisoners were often used in fulfilment of his ideas by working the land within the colony. Other detainees were involved in administrative work: 

“They started bringing servicepersons from Azovstal. Our job was to meet servicepersons, make a description, take pictures – in other words, compile a database of prisoners of war. They collected all personal data as much as possible, like a bank.” 

However, the PoWs also did combat-adjacent tasks in and outside of the prison. The OHCHR received reports of “a group of Ukrainian PoWs from a penal colony near Olenivka [collecting and loading] dead bodies in Mariupol in May and June 2022.” Another possible form of forced labour was elaborated upon in part one of this investigation; namely, the digging of mass graves by detainees. A civilian detainee who was released from Olenivka Correctional Colony in April 2022 said the following about this: 

“And every day in the prison some of the detainees did some work in the kitchen or some other tasks. The man who was on [a] similar duty that day, upon returning to the cell, said that today he was digging graves right on the territory of the colony.”

Moreover, a former PoW recalled that: 

“It should also be noted that on 27 July, when we were settled there, the prisoners of war were digging a trench for the guards near this barrack. Although there were no trenches on the whole territory of the prison before and they did not dig such fortifications.”

Although the released PoW did not give more details about the purpose of the digging of trenches, considering the timing one could assume that it was done in preparation of the violence that was to follow in the days after. 

Legal Framework

The GC III allows a Detaining Power to utilise the labour of PoWs, but only under certain conditions and for “work that is not dangerous, humiliating, or military in nature”.  Article 6 of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations additionally provides for the possibility for the Detaining Power to use the labour of prisoners of war. However, in accordance with these provisions, the tasks should not be connected with the operations of war and the prisoners must be paid for the execution of such labour. In Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, the Appeals Chamber found that “treatment of non-combatant detainees may be considered cruel where, together with the other requisite elements, that treatment causes serious mental or physical suffering or injury or constitutes a serious attack on human dignity.” The Appeals Chamber deemed that the “use of persons taking no active part in hostilities to prepare military fortifications for use in operations and against the forces with whom those persons identify or sympathise is a serious attack on human dignity and causes serious mental (and depending on the circumstances physical) suffering or injury.”

Analysis

Since the renovation, administrative and agricultural tasks that detainees were made to do are not military in nature, nor can those tasks be considered dangerous, this would not be a breach of international humanitarian law. But, in one article it is claimed that detainees received no compensation for the work they had done, which, if management indeed omitted to pay PoWs for their labour, would be a violation of the GC III and the 1899 and 1907 The Hague Regulations.

Forced labour of combat-adjacent nature, such as the collecting of dead bodies and subsequent digging of trenches and mass graves is a different matter. Similarly to the Appeals Chamber’s reasoning in the Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskić case, it can be argued that making persons who take no active part in hostilities dig mass graves or collect bodies of persons with whom they identify or sympathise is a serious attack on human dignity and could have caused serious mental suffering. This form of labour would be a violation of the laws or customs of war under Common Article 3(1)(a) of the Geneva Conventions and Articles 49 and 52 of the GC III..

Sexual violence 

Facts

In a news article, the Office of the Prosecutor-General of Ukraine lists sexual violence as one of the tactics used by the Olenivka employees to humiliate and degrade PoWs. The OHCHR also reported that “[p]enitentiary guards from Russian-affiliated armed groups subjected men POWs to [...] sexual violence”. For instance, one PoW said that guards had “attached wires to [his] genitalia and nose and shocked [him]. They simply had fun and were not interested in my replies to their questions”. This is corroborated by another PoW who reported to the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine that “Russian armed forces used such methods as electric shocks on men’s genitals or lifting them with a rope tied to their genitals, to force them to sign self incriminating documents” in Olenivka Correctional Colony. Additionally, some former PoWs held in Olenivka told the Independent Commission that they had been threatened “to be put on the bottle”, which is a euphemism for rape. Others mention that detained soldiers were stripped naked or forced to undress upon arrival and to bend forward.

Legal Framework

The Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Furundžija recognised that various forms of sexual violence, including rape and being forced to watch sexual attacks on another, may cause physical and mental suffering amounting to torture. Furthermore, as sexual violence often contains a degree of public humiliation, the act may also constitute an outrage upon personal dignity, even when it does not reach the threshold of torture. The Trial Chamber in the Prosecutor v. Simić case, for instance, determined that forcing victims to stand with their legs apart in order to receive kicks to their genitals and threatening the removal of genitalia could be considered as an aggravating element of sexual and humiliating nature in increasing “the mental suffering and feeling of degradation” experienced by victims.

Analysis

Although not much is known as of yet, it is very likely that PoWs were subjected to some kind of form of sexual violence at Olenivka, as the Ukrainian Prosecutor-General has stated that “about 90 percent of Ukrainian prisoners of war have been subjected to torture, rape, threats of sexual violence or other forms of ill-treatment”. Also, the UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict documented 85 cases of conflict-related sexual violence against civilians and prisoners of war. In most cases, sexual violence was used as a method of torture during captivity by Russian armed forces and law enforcement. This included (threats of) rape, electric shocks and beatings to the genitals, threats of castration, genital mutilation, unwanted touching, forced stripping and nudity. The one example mentioned above of guards subjecting a PoW to electric shocks to the genitalia could possibly amount to torture since it occurred during the interrogation process and was done with the purpose of obtaining information from the detainee. The combination of beatings and acts of a sexual nature certainly causes great mental suffering and could therefore classify as torture within the meaning of Article 8(2)(a)(ii) of the Rome Statute.

1. Conflicting witness accounts 

The witness statements published by Russian state-owned television, Zvezda TV, provide a different account of the conditions in Olenivka. One PoW, who was interviewed in the hospital on 30 July 2022, was asked about the conditions in the colony and hospital, to which he responded: 

“Truly very good, I say it seriously, staff treat us very well. I’m saying it in all seriousness. Every time we are grateful to staff and all the time tell them “thank you”, we are fed very well, thank you, we are very glad, it is true..”

This statement was echoed by another PoW, Artem Zubov, who explicitly mentioned that “no torture or beatings took place”: 

“Conditions were pretty good as it must be in any colony. The food was provided 3 times per day. No torture or beatings took place. Administration employees treated us well, no one was rude.”

In light of the reports published by the OHCHR and the Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, and the interviews conducted by non-Russian state news outlets with PoWs that have since been released, there is evidence to counter the claims made in these interviews. Many of the released detainees talked about ill-treatment. It appears then that the statements above could have been made under pressure from the Russian journalists interviewing the detainees shortly after their arrival in the hospital. This impacts the credibility of the interviews conducted right after the night of 28 July 2022.

Conclusion

The facts gathered by OSINT FOR UKRAINE show that the colony’s management inflicted severe physical suffering upon numerous PoWs by beating them, and even causing several fatalities, or by withholding medical treatment amongst other things. Furthermore, the PoWs were also subjected to mental pain or suffering in the form of forced labour, forced singing and other kinds of humiliating treatment. Several detainees noted the particularly harsh treatment endured by Azov Regiment members within other detention facilities, such as Taganrog Prison. These accounts align with findings from the Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, which documented instances of severe mistreatment inflicted upon prisoners of war from Mariupol city, with Azov Regiment members facing heightened levels of brutality. 

While civilians were also subjected to acts of torture, testimonies indicate that the Azov Regiment PoWs endured even more severe treatment across various penal institutions, illustrating a pattern of targeted abuse directed towards individuals associated with the Azov Regiment by guards within these facilities. Consequently, the first two contextual elements of the war crime of torture as laid out in 8(2)(a)(ii) of the Rome Statute have been met as the perpetrator inflicted pain or suffering for such a purpose as to discriminate against PoWs because of their association to a group with an ideology contrary to that of the perpetrator or to obtain information or a confession from PoWs.

Ill treatment and torture during and post-explosion

Injuries sustained during the explosion

Following a protracted period of alleged mistreatment and acts of torture within Olenivka Correctional Colony, during the evening of 28 July 2022, a catastrophic explosion occurred within the barracks, resulting in the fatalities of over 50 PoWs, all purportedly affiliated with the Azov Regiment of National Guard Unit 3057, and causing numerous additional injuries. Subsequent to the explosion, survivors sustaining severe injuries, inclusive of burns and shrapnel wounds, purportedly did not receive immediate medical attention from personnel within the correctional colony. Konstiantyn, a PoW who  was released in September 2023, said that PoWs who were injured in the explosion received no medical assistance from their captors. “Those injured helped others with everything they had at hand,” he said, “[d]octors among the captives were allowed to help, but it was not enough.” Reportedly, several victims succumbed to their injuries prior to their eventual transportation to medical facilities, which occurred hours subsequent to the incident. Those with less severe injuries allegedly underwent further seclusion for a duration of one month.

Following the aforementioned explosion, several PoWs were subjected to interviews by Zvezda, purportedly a news outlet affiliated with the Russian Defense Ministry. In the footage, Vasyl Lomakin exhibited facial lacerations consistent with shrapnel wounds. Following the explosions, Lomakin lost consciousness and, upon regaining it, was forcibly removed from the premises while exhibiting indications of arterial bleeding, prompting him to apply pressure to the affected area. Lomakin's recollection of subsequent events included being conveyed to a medical facility “closer in the morning”, albeit the specific timing remains vague. Ivan Karnaushenko, in his interview, recounted sustaining facial lacerations necessitating the extraction of shrapnel fragments. Karnaushenko conveyed his gratitude for avoiding surgical intervention, albeit acknowledging a fractured limb and the requirement for sutures to address wounds located across his facial features and lower extremities.

“[his] face was cut open, [and] shrapnel was pulled out.” 

“[his] face, nose, eyebrows were cut, [and] that debris had to be removed from his legs.”

Danylo Yan, in a separate interview, disclosed the necessity of undergoing lower limb amputation as a consequence of injuries sustained during the explosion. Footage of Yan depicts facial bandages, suggesting potential head injuries or shrapnel-related trauma. Oleg Demchuk reportedly sustained lower limb injuries resulting from the impact of a missile striking the roof in close proximity. Another PoW, Yehor Karnyushkin, purportedly suffered chest injuries. Oleg Abdyukov, during his interview, recounted a harrowing escape from the premises, citing significant blood loss. Abdyukov narrated an incident where the structural integrity of his sleeping quarters was compromised, resulting in his bedmate falling upon him subsequent to the explosion, despite which he managed to remove himself from the situation. Serhii Alieksieievych showed facial contusions. Supplementary footage showcases additional PoWs receiving medical treatment within a healthcare facility.

Treatment after the explosion

Moreover, subsequent to 29 July 2022, a Ukrainian civilian detainee acting in the capacity of a liaison for the administration issued instructions to PoWs engaged in clearing debris around Barrack 200 and relocating bodies, mandating their silence regarding the events they witnessed. 

The Zvezda interview with Danylo Yan serves as a representative instance wherein the interviewer attempted to guide the responses of the injured PoWs to conform to the Russian narrative. This is exemplified by inquiries regarding the immediate providers of aid (Yan's response: “Russian Federation servicemen, colony’s employees”) and inquiries into their treatment. Multiple interviewees mention receiving initial medical assistance, yet one detainee elaborates on PoWs administering aid to one another, suggesting a scenario wherein colony personnel provided no assistance and left the PoWs to fend for themselves. 

Analysis

As previously explained, within the scope of this investigation, medical treatment is mandated to be administered by qualified medical personnel, without discriminatory practices, and with expediency. Despite the existence of a functional, albeit small in light of the number of detainees,  medical unit at Olenivka Correctional Colony in July 2022, it is conceivable that due to the timing of the explosion, no personnel were present within the medical facility. Nevertheless, given the presence of an infirmary and a pharmacy on the premises, the administration ought to have promptly provided initial medical assistance to the injured or requested any available medical personnel to fulfil their duties for the health of the detainees. Numerous testimonies assert that initially, Azov medics, who were among the detainees in Barrack 200, provided assistance as feasible. However, it was alleged that the administration allowed other captured medics—whether civilian or from different regiments—to attend to the injured only two to three hours after the explosions, and refrained from equipping medical PoWs with the requisite tools for treating the injured prior to this delay.  Moreover, surviving PoWs were taken to nearby hospitals in Donetsk only 5 to 7 hours after the attack, in overcrowded trucks driving over bumpy roads, which very likely caused additional suffering. The OHCHR investigation conducted in 2022 concluded that expedient medical care could have significantly mitigated the casualty count. In conjunction with accounts of staff passively observing while Azov medics and other PoWs rendered aid to the injured, these actions cannot be construed as meeting the standard of providing treatment with “the least possible delay”. Rather, they could be interpreted as the Olenivka administration actively prolonging suffering by obstructing PoWs from accessing the vital medical assistance necessary for survival. Consequently, these actions arguably constitute a breach of Article 30 of the Third Geneva Convention and could amount to torture within the meaning of Article 8(2)(a)(ii) of the Rome Statute.

Administration of fatalities and injuries

Shortly after the explosion, the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation published two lists, along with a statement; one list contains 48 names of PoWs who died during or soon after the explosion in Olenivka and the other list contains 73 names of PoWs who were injured that night. The Russian Ministry of Defence itself confirmed that two more PoWs had died on their way to a hospital, making it a total of 50 fatalities. Although, as mentioned above, detainees compiled information for a database with personal details of each and every PoW, the lists were not complete and even contained mistakes. For instance, two names are mentioned on both lists: Тищенко Дмитро Павлович is no. 27 on the list of deceased PoWs and no. 73 on the list of injured PoWs, and Лобов Олег Валерійович is no. 44 on the list of deceased and no. 38 on the list of injured PoWs. Both men are reportedly still alive. As of July 2023, 47 bodies have been returned to Ukraine and have been identified. The total number of casualties and injured PoWs has not been confirmed and is most likely higher than has been reported by the Russian Ministry of Defence.

Legal Framework

Every death or serious injury of a prisoner of war caused or suspected to have been caused by any person, or if the cause of death is unknown, shall be followed by an official and effective enquiry by the Detaining Power. Via a communication, the Protecting Power shall be informed about this enquiry. Furthermore, in accordance with Articles 120 and 122 of GC III, the Detaining Power shall forward as rapidly as possible a certified list of all prisoners of war who have died as PoW or death certificates to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau. This certified list or the death certificate should mention particulars of identity, such as the date and place of death, the cause of death, the first and last names, rank and date of birth.

Analysis

The Russian Federation has not provided access to the site, nor has the OHCHR been able to confirm that Russian authorities carried out any formal investigation. The Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation did report about its examination of the site, and its questioning of victims and witnesses, but it is unclear whether the Investigative Committee ever finalised its investigation as no report about the outcome has been published. Moreover, before conducting the enquiry, the Investigative Committee already showed partiality in its reporting by making claims such as that “in order to eliminate witnesses to the crimes committed, Ukraine struck the pre-trial detention centre in [Olenivka]”. Finally, the 30 July 2022 lists that were published by the Russian Ministry of Defence on Telegram have not been amended or updated since their publication. Thus, Russian authorities did not fully comply with the obligations as set out in Articles 120, 121 and 122 of GC III.

Current whereabouts

The PoWs who were injured and survived the explosion were subsequently taken to other detention facilities across the DPR and the Russian Federation. For the most part, the families do not know where their relatives are. Civilian detainees have confirmed that they too had no direct communication with the world outside Olenivka and lost contact with family from day one, making it seem like they vanished. Relatives found out about their release through someone else. 

Legal Framework

Articles 70 and 71 of the GC III state that PoWs “shall be allowed to send and receive letters and cards” and that “said number shall not be less than two letters and four cards monthly”. Particularly, Article 71 acknowledges the significant impact of regular communication, particularly through mail, on the mental well-being of prisoners. Moreover, preventing PoWs from contacting their family members and providing families with evasive information in order to mislead them as to the location and condition of PoWs have been used in support of the findings of torture and murder by international tribunals.

Analysis 

Given that the PoWs had no possibility to contact their families during and after their detention at Olenivka, and taking into account that many families still do not know where their relatives are, the Russian and DPR authorities did not fully comply with the principles of international humanitarian law as laid down in articles 70 and 71 of the GC III and judgments by international courts and tribunals. 

Conviction

The suffering of the Ukrainian PoWs who have not yet been released does not end with the 28 July explosion. The Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, along with the Supreme Court of the DPR, have released information about six cases of former Olenivka PoWs being convicted under the criminal code of the Russian Federation for crimes committed in Mariupol and nearby villages prior to their captivity. They have all been sentenced to long-term imprisonment, often in strict-regime penal colonies, putting them at risk of further traumatisation. 

Case #1. 

Who: A PoW from the Azov Regiment, military unit 3057 of the Eastern Operational-Territorial Association of the National Guard of Ukraine. 

Crimes: cruel treatment of civilians, use of prohibited means and methods of combat in an armed conflict, attempted murder of two or more persons committed by a group with a generally dangerous method, motivated by ideological and political hatred, and intentional damage to another’s property using a generally dangerous method. 

Sentence: long-term imprisonment, ranging from 26 to 27 years.

According to the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, in the period between 25 of  February and 19 March 2022, soldiers of the Azov Regiment, including one of the PoWs who survived the explosion in Olenivka, conducted indiscriminate ‘rolling’ artillery shelling on residential buildings and the socially significant civilian infrastructure of the settlements in the villages of Stary Crimea and Lebedinskoye (DPR). As a result of these acts, five households were damaged, causing significant financial loss to the owners. Civilians who were in the buildings during the shelling were not injured. The Court held that the soldiers had been aware of the illegality of the command orders and nonetheless accepted their execution.

Case #2

Who: Two PoWs from the Azov Regiment, military Unit 3057 of the Eastern Operational-Territorial Association of the National Guard of Ukraine. 

Crimes: Cruel treatment of civilians, use of prohibited means and methods of combat in an armed conflict, attempted murder motivated by ideological and political hatred and enmity, and intentional damage to another’s property using a generally dangerous method

Sentence: 25 years imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony. 

As provided by the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, between 1 and 14 March 2022, three soldiers of the Azov Regiment, including two former Olenivka PoWs, targeted two homes with the intention to intimidate the civilian population opposed to the Azov battalion and destroy residential homes. During the two weeks, 20 shots were fired using fragmentation-explosives. As a result of these criminal actions, the residential homes were destroyed, but no civilians were harmed.

The Investigative Committee has uploaded video footage of interrogations of suspects on Vk.com. The video material shows the interrogated PoWs speaking in a prescribed manner, using practically identical phrases. When asked about the charged crimes, the PoWs respond in an unusually formal, precise manner, using official language. They never ask for questions to be repeated or clarified, giving the impression that each answer had been previously prepared and learned. One individual stutters significantly and confesses even before being asked whether he pleads guilty. 

Case # 3 

Who: Former battalion sergeant in the Azov Regiment 

Crimes: murder of two persons committed by a group, motivated by ideological and political hatred, cruel treatment of civilians, use of prohibited means and methods of combat in an armed conflict. 

Sentence: 26 years imprisonment in a strict-regime correctional colony. 

On 11 September 2023, the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation published information that in March 2022 another former PoW from Olenivka who was a former battalion sergeant shot two civilians, a man and a woman, with a rifle he carried. Due to their sustained injuries, both died at the crime scene. The information claimed that the former sergeant had believed that the civilians held pro-Russian views, and he was allegedly motivated by political and ideological hatred towards the couple. According to the Court, his actions also followed a criminal plan directed by Ukraine's higher military and political leadership to maintain the occupation regime on the territory of the DPR . 

Case # 4 

Who: Senior sergeant in the Azov Regiment 

Crimes: cruel treatment of civilians, use of prohibited means and methods of combat in an armed conflict, attempted murder committed with a method dangerous to the general public, motivated by ideological and political hatred and enmity, and intentional damage to another's property using a method dangerous to the general public.

Sentence: 25 years imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony. 

On 14 November 2023, the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation published information about the sentencing of a PoW who had previously been held in Olenivka. According to the Committee, the senior sergeant deliberately gave orders to his subordinates to fire mortar rounds at residential houses and civilian infrastructure objects. As a result of the firing, a man was wounded by shrapnel, civilian structures were damaged, and private homes were destroyed. The Court held that the orders were a part of a wider plan to annihilate the civilian population and destroy socially significant objects of the city and adjacent settlements to counter the inability to hold combat positions in the Left Bank district of Mariupol. 

Case # 5 

Who: Grenade launcher assistant in the Azov Regiment 

Crimes: cruel treatment of civilians and attempted murder of two or more persons, committed by a group and motivated by ideological and political hatred.

Sentence: 20 years imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony. 

According to information released in August 2023 on the website of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, another former PoW from Olenivka participated in an assault on two civilians. The grenade launcher assistant was among the individuals who, during redeployment on a cargo truck, discovered a car and aimed more than 50 shots at two men inside the vehicle. One of the civilians managed to leave the car and hide from the shots behind the vehicle, while the other stayed inside waiting for the shooting to cease. In the end, both men managed to escape. The defendants supposedly believed that the men supported the Russian military operations and held pro-Russian views. 

Case # 6

Who: Commander of the 3rd Division, 1st Battalion, Special Operations Detachment Azov.

Crimes: Cruel treatment of civilian population, use of prohibited means and methods of combat in an armed conflict, murder committed by an organised group and motivated by political and ideological hatred.

Sentence: 25 years imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony. 

In the post published on 22 November 2023, the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation informed about another conviction and sentencing order against a PoW previously detained in Olenivka. According to the Committee, on 28 February 2022, the former commander used an automatic weapon to shoot a civilian man who approached military equipment of the group. Consequently, the man died on the spot. The Court concluded that the defendant followed an order from the higher command to open fire and kill anyone who approached the military equipment, including civilians. The defendant was also motivated by ideological hatred against the man seemingly supporting the ‘special military operation’.

Legal Framework

The Detaining Power is allowed to try PoWs for acts that are punishable under domestic laws of said Detaining Power or under international law. However, no moral or physical coercion may be exerted on a PoW in order to induce them to admit guilt of the act of which they are accused. Additionally, fair trial rights are still applicable meaning that a PoW may not be convicted without the opportunity to present his defence and without the assistance of a qualified counsel. A failure to secure these rights constitutes a war crime prosecutable by international criminal tribunals. 

After conviction, sentences shall be served in the same establishments and under the same conditions as in the case of members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power and “[p]risoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention”. Thus, prisoners of war undergoing judicial punishment are to be transferred to penitentiaries designated for convicted military personnel belonging to the Detaining Power and are to be treated the same way.

Analysis

The former Olenivka PoWs, who were prosecuted in the above cases, were brought before the court, convicted and sentenced in accordance with the criminal code of the Russian Federation. Yet, it is not certain whether they were afforded the basic procedural guarantees as provided by the GC III. The footage raises suspicions of coercion behind the suspects’ confessions to the charged crimes. Furthermore, considering the widespread practice of torture and mistreatment in the Russian prisons, there is a high risk of further re-victimisation and re-traumatisation of defendants who already suffered from the atrocities they experienced at Olenivka and will now be detained for another 20 to 27 years in unknown penal colonies.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the tragic events that unfolded at the Olenivka Correctional Colony on the night of 28 and 29 July 2022 demonstrate the victimisation of PoWs through acts of torture and war crimes. The evidence presented reveals a systematic pattern of abuse and maltreatment inflicted upon the PoWs, culminating in the tragic loss of life and injuries resulting from the bombing of the barracks.

The treatment endured by the PoWs, including beatings, psychological torture, forced labor, and denial of medical assistance, demonstrates the deliberate infliction of severe physical and mental suffering, which meets the threshold for torture as defined by international standards and represents clear violations of international humanitarian law and human rights conventions. Such actions contravene the principles enshrined in the GC III, which mandates humane treatment of PoWs at all times and prohibits any acts endangering their health or life.

Moreover, the deliberate targeting of the barrack housing the PoWs constitutes a grave breach of international law, particularly Article 8(2)(a)(ii) of the Rome Statute, which identifies torture and inhuman treatment within the context of an international armed conflict as war crimes. The failure to provide prompt medical assistance following the explosion further exacerbates the severity of the violations committed.

The efforts of international bodies, including the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the United Nations, and the OHCHR, to investigate and document these atrocities underscore the gravity of the situation. Despite obstacles to accessing the site and gathering evidence, the testimonies of survivors and meticulous analysis of available data corroborate the widespread and systematic nature of the abuses perpetrated against the PoWs.

 In light of these findings, it is imperative that those responsible for the torture and war crimes at the Olenivka Correctional Colony are held accountable under both domestic and international law. Justice must be pursued not only for the victims and their families but also to uphold the fundamental principles of humanity and dignity in times of conflict. The international community must remain vigilant in upholding the principles of human rights and ensuring that perpetrators of torture and war crimes are brought to justice, thereby reaffirming the collective commitment to justice, accountability, and respect for human dignity. 

In addition, our investigation will continue with the forthcoming publication of PART 3, which will focus on identifying the perpetrators responsible for the acts outlined in this report and examining the chain of command. This next part will delve deeper into the individuals and entities involved in the torture and war crimes committed at the Olenivka Correctional Colony, shedding light on their roles, motivations, and the potential accountability mechanisms under both domestic and international legal frameworks with which perpetrators can be held responsible.

Investigators

Vyacheslav Kolomeets

Vyacheslav is a Lead Investigator and OSINT specialist. He is actively engaged in advocating for the use of OSINT and investigative techniques to combat corruption and human rights abuses, particularly those perpetrated by armed forces in conflict regions. Vyacheslav's dedication to justice and his passion for IT and OSINT led him to pursue a career in investigative work.

Authors

Margot V. H. 

Margot is the co-director of ICIG. She is a graduate in public international law and international criminology, with a particular focus on conflict-related sexual violence. At OSINT for Ukraine, she is responsible for writing legal analyses and bridging the gap between OSINT and international law.

Olya

Olya is a Ukrainian lawyer with expertise in corporate law, commercial law, and forensics. At OSINT for Ukraine, she does investigations, data analysis and helps with translation.

A.P.

A. holds a degree in public international law, specialising in international criminal law. She also has experience in working on issues of transnational organised crime. At OSINT for Ukraine, A. focuses on legal analyses. 

Madelief A. 

Madelief is a third year Bachelor of Security Studies student with a focus on international relations, cyber security, and public international law. With a professional background in private international law and academic interest in international humanitarian law, Madelief mainly works on legal analysis for the ICIG department.

Manon-Catherine Balbinot

Manon-Catherine, legal analyst, has a robust background in Criminal Justice and Counter-Terrorism. She brings extensive expertise in transnational organised crime, access to justice, and European Criminal Law. At OSINT for Ukraine, she is responsible for writing legal analyses and connects OSINT with international legal frameworks.

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References

1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, ‘Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Regarding Brutal War Crimes Committed by Russian Servicemen Against Ukrainian Prisoners of War’, 29 July 2022, available at https://mfa.gov.ua/en/news/statement-ministry-foreign-affairs-ukraine-regarding-brutal-war-crimes-committed-russian-servicemen-against-ukrainian-prisoners-war.

2. Kommersant, ‘Azov Started and Went’, 18 May 2022, available at https://sledcom.ru/search/?q=%D0%95%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BA%D0%B0&page=5&sort=&dates=. 

3.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 29 July 2022, supra note 1.

4.  S. Dujarric, ‘Highlights of the Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesman for Secretary-General António Guterres’, Office of the Spokesperson for the UN Secretary-General, 5 January 2023, available at https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/highlight/2023-01-05.html.  

5.  OHCHR, ‘Türk Decries Lack of Accountability for Olenivka Killings’, 25 July 2023, available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/07/turk-decries-lack-accountability-olenivka-killings.  

6.  Art. 13 GC III. 

7.  J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law: Rules (2009), Vol. 1 at 315. 

8.  Art. 8 Rome Statute; G. Werle and F. Jeßberger, Principles of International Criminal Law (2020), para. 1267. 

9.  ICC, Elements of Crimes, Article 8 (2) (a) (ii)-1. 

10.  International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić et al. (Čelebići Camp), Trial Judgement, Case No. IT-96-21, 16 November 1998, para. 468. 

11.  K. Ambos, ed., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Article-by-Article Commentary (2022) at 3743. 

12.  ICTY, Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvočka et al., Trial Judgement, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, 2 November 2001, para. 144. 

13.  See Ambos, supra note 11, at 374.

14.  International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Trial Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998, paras. 594–95; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarać et al. (Foča Case), Trial Judgement, Case No. IT-96-23-T& IT-96-23/1-T, 22 February 2001, para. 142. 

15.  ICTY, Prosecutor v. Simić et al., Trial Judgement, Case No. IT-95-9-T, 17 October 2003, para. 80, referring to, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelać, Trial Judgement, Case No. IT–97-25-T, 15 March 2002, para. 182; Prosecutor v. Mrkšić et al., Trial Judgement, Case No. IT-95-13/1-T, para. 514, referring to, Kvočka et al. supra note 12, para. 143. See also Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), The Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch Trial Judgement, Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC-TC, para. 355.

16.  See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić et al., supra note 10, para. 552; Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Trial Judgement, Case No. IT-95-14, 3 March 2000, para. 186.

17.  Art. 1 CAT. 

18.  Art. 16 CAT.

19.  Art. 10 CAT.

20.  Art. 12 CAT.

21.  Art. 2 CAT.

22.  See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić et al., supra note 10, para. 454. See also E. de Wet, ‘The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of Jus Cogens and Its Implications for National and Customary Law’, (2004) 15(1) European Journal of International Law 97.

23.  The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules For the Treatment of Prisoners (The Nelson Mandela Rules), Rule 1, A/RES/70/175, 8 January 2016, available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Nelson_Mandela_Rules-E-ebook.pdf.  

24.  See e.g., Simeonovi v. Bulgaria, (ECtHR, 12 May 2017), para. 90 (in which the Grand Chamber held that serving a life sentence in poor conditions and under a very restrictive regime amounted to inhuman treatment); Kalashnikov v. Russia, (ECtHR, 15 July 2002), para. 102 (poor conditions in detention as degrading treatment).

25.  Chember v. Russia, (ECtHR, 3 July 2008), para. 57 (the applicant, a conscript suffering from health problems, was subjected to an excessive level of physical exercise imposed as punishment which, according to the Court, amounted to inhuman treatment).

26.  The Nelson Mandela Rules, 8 January 2016, supra note 23, Rule 1.

27.  Art. 438 Ukrainian Criminal Code [as amended in 2021].

28.  Art. 4 GC III. See also Rule 106 of the ICRC’s List on Customary International Humanitarian Law;  J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law: Rules (2009),Vol. 1I, at 384-389.

29.  Ibid.

30.  Voanews, ‘Explainer: Who Were Mariupol's Last Defenders?’, 21 May 2022, available at https://www.voanews.com/a/explainer-who-were-mariupol-s-last-defenders-/6584122.html. 

31.  ‘International Armed Conflict in Ukraine’, Rule of Law in Armed Conflict (RULAC), last updated on 7 June 2023, available at https://www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/international-armed-conflict-in-ukraine. 

32. Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine’ (A-HRC-55-66-au), 5 March 2024, paras. 59, 60. See also OHCHR, ‘Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, 1 December 2023 - 29 February 2024’, 26 March 2024, paras. 6, 43-53, available at https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/ukraine/2024/report-human-rights-situation-ukraine-1-dec-2023-29-feb-2024.pdf. 

33. Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine’ (A/78/540), 19 October 2023, para. 54.

34.  Art. 7(1) Rome Statute.

35.  OHCHR, ‘Report on the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Persons Hors De Combat in the Context of the Armed Attack by the Russian Federation Against Ukraine’, 24 March 2023, para. 67, available at https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2023-10/23-03-24-ukraine-thematic-report-pows-en.pdf. 

36.  Ibid., para. 63.

37.  Ibid.

38.  Ibid.

39.  M. Klymyk, T. Katrychenko and A. Prikhno, ‘War Crime in Olenivka: Investigation into the Events Related to the Massacre of Imprisoned Azov Regiment Soldiers’, MIHR, 26 July 2023.

40.  Ibid.; V. Ponomoreva, ‘“Dying Isn’t As Bad As Being A Russian POW”: Freed Ukrainian Soldiers Speak Out About Their Time in Russian Captivity’, The Insider, 15 April 2024, available at https://theins.ru/en/confession/270824; OHCHR, 24 March 2023, supra note 35, para. 63; B. Trew, ‘Inside Olenivka, the Russian Prison Camp where Ukrainians Vanish’, The Independent, 21 August 2022, available at https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-ukraine-war-news-olenivka-prison-b2149435.html. 

41.  B. Trew, 21 August 2022, supra note 40.

42.  Insecurity Insight, eyeWitness to Atrocities, Media Initiative for Human Rights (“MIHR”), Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) and the Ukrainian Healthcare Center (UHC), ‘Destruction and Devastation: One Year of Russia’s Assault on Ukraine’s Health Care System’, 21 February 2023, at 51, available at https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/destruction-and-devastation-one-year-russias-assault-ukraines-health-care-system. 

43.  Ibid. See also OHCHR, 26 March 2024, supra note 32, para. 46.

44.  A. Tenisheva, ‘One Month After 50 Ukrainian PoWs Died, Ex-Inmates Detail Abuse at Olenivka Prison’, The Moscow Times, 29 August 2022, available at https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/08/29/one-month-on-ex-inmates-recount-abuse-in-olenivka-where-50-ukrainian-prisoners-died-a78673. See also Insecurity Insight et al., supra note 42, at 51 (in which other detainees corroborate that “upon transfer to Olenivka, detainees were forced to sit for hours in ‘slav squat’, a position requiring them to lock their hands behind their neck and squat, heels to the ground. Those who moved were beaten with clubs and rubber batons or kicked. Detained soldiers were also stripped naked.”).

45.  Ibid.

46.  Yale Humanitarian Research Lab, ‘System of Filtration: Mapping Russia’s Detention Operations in Donetsk Oblast’, 25 August 2022, at 11.

47. A. Kostiuchenko and P. Sukhodolskyi, ‘He Survived the Defence of Azovstal, Russian Captivity in Olenivka, Torture and Starvation’, Voice of America, 17 January 2024, available at https://www.holosameryky.com/a/vin-perezhyv-oboronu-azovstali-rosiiskyi-polon-v-olenivtsi-katuvannia-ta-holod/7443637.html. 

48.  Ibid.

49.  Television Service of News (ТСН), ‘This Will Shock the Whole World! Russian Captivity: The Whole Truth About Torture and Murder | Marine Didur’, 12 September 2023 [YouTube video], available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DsH7V4hlTM.

50.  Ibid. 

51.  Insecurity Insight et al., 21 February 2023, supra note 42, at 51.

52.  Ibid., at 50.

53.  Ibid.

54.  Luke Harding, ‘Absolute Evil’: Inside the Russian Prison Camp Where Dozens of Ukrainians Burned to Death’, The Guardian, 6 August 2022, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/06/russian-prison-camp-ukrainians-deaths-donetsk. 

55.  Ibid.

56.  ICTY, Prosecutor v. Rasim Delić, Trial Judgement, Case No. IT-04-83-T, 15 September 2008, paras. 15, 308, 319.

57.  Landmark cases include ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, supra note 14, paras. 16, 17, 21, 22, 23 of the Indictment; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Trial Judgement, Case No. IT-94-14/1-T, 25 June 1999, paras. 184-210; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Trial Judgement, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998, para. 267; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunaraċ et al., supra note 14, paras. 24, 27, 157, 747, 573, 747, 780-782.

58.  OHCHR, 24 March 2023, supra note 35, paras. 51, 68. See also L. Hryniuk, ‘Arsen “Lemko” Dmytryk, Battalion Commander of the Azov Brigade To Anyone Who Starts Talking About the “Brotherly people”, Tell Them About Olenivka’, Ukrinform, 8 August 2023, available at https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3745769-arsen-lemko-dmitrik-komandir-bataljonu-brigadi-azov.html (in which a former PoW held in Olenivka confirms that someone came back from ‘the factory’ and was infected with hepatitis).

59.  A. Tenisheva, 29 August 2022, supra note 44.

60.  Insecurity Insight et al., 21 February 2023, supra note 42, at 59.

61.  Elina Sulima, ‘Three Stories About The Abuse and Inhumane Conditions for Ukrainian Women Prisoners’, ZMINA, 4 August 2023, available at https://zmina.info/en/articles-en/three-stories-about-the-abuse-and-inhumane-conditions-for-ukrainian-women-prisoners/. 

62.  Insecurity Insight et al., 21 February 2023, supra note 42, at 59.

63.  Ibid.

64.  Art. 30 GC III; Commentary of 2020 to GC III, para. 2227.

65.  Art. 30 GC III; Commentary of 2020 to GC III, paras. 2232, 2241, 2242.

66.  Art. 30 GC III.

67.  ICTY, Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvočka et al., supra note 12, paras. 64-67.

68.  Ibid., para. 151.

69.  Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine (ECtHR, 14 March 2013), para. 87, referring to European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), Extract from the 3rd General Report of the CPT: Health Care Services in Prisons (CPT/Inf(93)12-part), 4 June 1993, para. 38. 

70.  Доставка передач в СИЗО и тюрьмы, ‘Volnovakha Correctional Colony No. 120’, last modified on 28 May 2023; STB Windows, ‘I Went through TORTURE IN OLENIVKA. The Horrors of Russian Captivity - The Story of A Volunteer from the Dnipro’, 29 July 2022 [YouTube video], available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tey3DmKWLGQ; DPR Ministry of Justice, ‘Medical workers are required to Work in the Subordinate Institutions of the State Penitentiary Services’, 21 July 2020, available at https://minjust-dnr.ru/dlya-raboty-v-podvedomstvennyh-uchrezhdeniya-gsin-trebuyutsya-meditsinskie-rabotniki/ (vacancy for a position as medical specialist in Volnovakha correctional colony). 

71.  Insecurity Insight et al., 21 February 2023,  supra note 42, at 59.

72.  See ICRC, ‘Respecting and Protecting Health Care in Armed Conflicts and in Situations not Covered by International Humanitarian Law’, March 2012, at 2; ICTY, Prosecutor v Kvočka et al., supra note 12, para. 151. 

73.  I. Sevryugin, ‘100 Days of Captivity in the “DNR”. What A Ukrainian Volunteer Had To Go Through’, Current Times, 22 July 2022, available at https://www.currenttime.tv/a/posudu-ispolzovali-po-krugu-odni-i-te-zhe-tarelki-na-250-300-chelovek-ih-nikto-ne-myl-ukrainskiy-volonter-o-100-dnyah-plena-v-dnr-/31954690.html; OHCHR, 24 March 2023, supra note 35, para. 68.

74.  T. Katrychenko, M. Klymyk and A. Prikhno, ‘Crimes in Olenivka: Chronology, Testimonies and Names of Those Involved’, MIHR, 1 December 2022, available at https://mipl.org.ua/en/crimes-in-olenivka-chronology-testimonies-and-names-of-those-involved/. 

75.  OHCHR, 24 March 2023, supra note 35, paras. 49, 68.

76.  Ibid., para. 7.

77.  Ibid., para. 68. See also Y .Gorbonova and K. Kvitka, ‘One Year Since Death of Ukrainian POWs in Explosion Olenivka Prison Incident Needs International Investigation’, Human Rights Watch, 28 July 2023, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/07/28/one-year-death-ukrainian-pows-explosion. 

78.  OHCHR, 24 March 2023, supra note 35, paras. 68, 76.

79.  A. Tenisheva, 29 August 2022, supra note 44. 

80.  B. Trew, 22 August 2022, supra note 40.

81.  MIHR, 1 December 2022, supra note 74.

82.  O. Barsukova, ‘Torture and “Terrorism” Cases. The Story of Volunteers from Mariupol Who Were Released from Captivity in Olenivka’, Pravda, 22 July 2022, available at https://life.pravda.com.ua/society/2022/07/22/249663/. 

83.  Art. 22 GC III; Commentary of 2020 to GC III, para. 1988.

84.  Art. 29 GC III; Commentary of 2020 to GC III, para. 2191.

85.  Art. 29 GC III; Commentary of 2020 to GC III, para. 2189.

86.  ECtHR, Guide on Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, para. 53.

87.  Ilaşcu et al. v. the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation, (ECtHR, 8 July 2004), paras. 438, 442, 443, 449, 451, 454. 

88.  Ibid., paras. 438, 442, 443, 449, 451, 454, (8), (9), (10), (11), (12).

89.  Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvočka et al., supra note 12, para. 155. 

90.  Ibid., paras. 169, 173, 174, referring to, Portorreal v. Dominican Republic, Human Rights Committee, No. 188/84; Brown v. Jamaica, Human Rights Committee, No. 775/97; Estrella v. Uruguay, Human Rights Committee, No. 79/1980; Greek case (1969) 12 Y.B.E. Comm.H.R.; Cyprus v. Turkey, (1976) 4 E.H.R.R. 482, 541.

91.  O. Barsukova, 22 July 2022, supra note 82.

92.  OHCHR, 24 March 2023, supra note 34, para. 27.

93.  OHCHR, 24 March 2023, supra note 34 para. 65 (in which it is noted that guards across various prison facilities forced PoWs to sing, as well as recite Russian patriotic songs and poetry.).

94.  A. Tenisheva, 29 August 2022, supra note 44. See also Human Rights Watch, ‘Ukraine: Russian Torture Center in Kherson: Unflawful Detention, Torture of Civilians during 8-month Occupation’, 13 April 2023 (in which a detainee who experienced something similar in a pretrial detention center in Kherson said that  “the worst was when we were forced to sing the Russian national anthem. We had to stand at attention and yell, “Glory to Russia!” … When someone sang … we had to clap for him. If we didn’t applaud [loudly enough], they’d take us from our cell and beat us again.”).

95.  National Police of Ukraine, ‘National Police Investigators Serve Notice of Suspicion to Head and Staff of Olenivka Correctional Colony for Torture of Captured Police Officer’, 4 March 2024, available at https://www.npu.gov.ua/news/slidchi-natspolitsii-oholosyly-nachalnyku-ta-pratsivnykam-olenivskoi-vypravnoi-kolonii-pidozru-za-katuvannia-polonenoho-politseiskoho?v=65e5849dddf9a. See also O. Rasulova and Y. Skibitska, ‘Mariupol Volunteers Were in Russian Captivity for 100 Days. Now the Released Are Helping to Find Those Who May Still Be in Olenivka. Here Are Two Stories to Search and Help and A (Rough) Walkthrough’, Babel, 29 August 2022, available at https://babel.ua/en/texts/83579-mariupol-volunteers-were-in-russian-captivity-for-100-days-now-the-released-are-helping-to-find-those-who-may-still-be-in-olenivka-here-are-two-stories-fo-search-and-help-and-a-rough-walkthrough.

96.  A. Kostiuchenko and P. Sukhodolskyi, 17 January 2024, supra note 46.

97.  Insecurity Insight et al., 21 February 2023, supra note 42, at 51.

98.  OHCHR, supra note 32, para. 46; MIHR, 1 December 2022, supra note 74.

99.  O. Stenko, ‘“I Took A Clerical Knife and Opened Stomachs” - How A Surgeon from Dnipro Saved Fighters in the Bunker and Survived in Captivity’, Gazeta.ua, 2 May 2023, available at https://gazeta.ua/ru/articles/life/_bral-kancelyarskij-nozh-i-otkryval-zhivoty-kak-hirurg-iz-dnepra-spasal-bojcov-v-bunkere-i-vyzhil-v-plenu/1142122.   

100.  Art. 13 GC III; Commentary of 2020 to GC III, para. 1563.

101.  See e.g., ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Trial Judgement, Case No. IT-94-I-T, 7 May 1997, paras. 154, 467, 468 (in which is described how detainees “were also subjected to degrading psychological abuse, by being forced to [...], sing Serbian nationalist songs [...]”); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić et al. (Čelebići Camp), supra note 10, para. 1269 (in which the Court describes how one defendant, driven by feelings of revenge against people of Serb ethnicity, made detainees shout certain slogans that were distasteful to them); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, Trial Judgement, Case No. IT-95-10-T, para. 76 (in which the Court notes that the defendant allegedly humiliated Muslims by forcing them to sing Serbian songs); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mladen Nlaletilic and Vinko Martinovic, Trial Judgement, Case No. IT-98-34-T, 31 March 2003, paras. 349, 350, 357 (in which the Trial Chamber gives several examples of witnesses who were forced to sing Croatian nationalistic songs); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Trial Judgement, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, para. 1298 (in which the Trial Chamber describes how “detainees were forced to sing songs and then forced to beat each other with the promise that the winner would be spared from being killed”).

102.  ICTY, Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvočka et al., supra note 12, paras. 75, 78, 197.

103.  Ibid., paras. 379, 388.

104.  J. Brauer, 2016, ‘How Can Music Be Torturous? Music in Nazi Concentration and Extermination Camps’, 10(1) Music and Politics, at 1.

105.  S.G. Cusick, 2016, ‘Music as Torture/ Music as Weapon’, Trans. Revista Transcultural de Música 10.

106.  M.J. Grant, 2014, ‘Pathways to Music Torture’, Transposition 4, at para. 10.

107.  J. Brauer, supra note 104, at 9, 11.

108.  M. J. Grant, supra note 106, para. 19.

109.  B. Trew, 21 August 2022, supra note 40; Yale Humanitarian Research Lab, 25 August 2022, supra note 46, at 18; MIHR, 1 December 2022, supra note 74.

110.  MIHR, 1 December 2022,  supra note 74.

111.  Ibid. (in which a civilian detainee also tells MIHR that she “asked for permission to peel potatoes in order to drive away bad thoughts and not to die of boredom.”).

112.  I. Sevryugin, 22 July 2022, supra note 73. 

113.  Ibid.; MIHR, 1 December 2022,  supra note 74 (for instance, the prisoners worked in the canteen, cooked and dispensed food, took care of the prison vegetable garden and the orchard).

114.  MIHR, 1 December 2022, supra note 74.

115.  OHCHR, 24 March 2023, supra note 35, para. 54.

116.  Yale Humanitarian Research Lab, 25 August 2022, supra note 46, at 10, 11. See also M. Schwirtz et al., ‘Ukraine Builds a Case That Killing of P.O.W.s Was a Russian War Crime’, The New York Times, 3 August 2022, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/03/world/europe/russia-ukraine-prisoners-killed.html.  

117.  Yale Humanitarian Research Lab, 25 August 2022, supra note 46, at 11, referring to Irina Lopotina, ‘How People Are Abducted During the Occupation and what Happens to Prisoners in Donetsk - Testimony of A Ukrainian Who Escaped’, New Voice, 6 May 2022, available at https://nv.ua/ukraine/events/chto-proishodit-s-ukraincami-v-sizo-i-koloniyah-tak-nazyvaemoy-dnr-rasskaz-ochevidca-50239703.html. 

118.  V. Korotkyi, ‘Mass Murder of Azovs in Olenivka: Story of Surviving Prisoner’, Ukrinform, 5 March 2024, available at https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3835986-mass-murder-of-azovs-in-olenivka-story-of-surviving-prisoner.html.

119.  OHCHR, 24 March 2023, supra note 34, at para. 54 referring to Arts. 49 and 52 GC III.

120.  Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 29 July 1899, Regulation Art. 6; Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907, Regulation Art. 6.

121.  Ibid.

122.  ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Appeal Judgement, Case No. IT-95-14-A, 29 July 2004, para. 597.

123.  Ibid.

124.  B. Trew, 21 August 2022, supra note 40.

125.  ‘Harsh Violence Against the Military Forces - The [Notification of] Suspicion was Reported to the Head and Inspector of the Colony in Olenivka, where the Military ZSU Were Detained’, Office of the Prosecutor-General, 28 July 2023, available at https://www.gp.gov.ua/ua/posts/zorstoke-povodzennya-z-viiskovopolonenimi-povidomleno-pro-pidozru-nacalniku-ta-inspektoru-koloniyi-v-olenivci-de-utrimuvalis-viiskovi-zsu.  

126.  OHCHR, 24 March 2023, supra note 35, para. 70.

127.  E. Farge, ‘Both Russia and Ukraine Tortured Prisoners of War, UN Says’, Reuters, 15 November 2022, available at https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/both-russia-ukraine-tortured-prisoners-war-un-says-2022-11-15/. 

128.  Human Rights Council, ‘Conference Room Paper of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine’ (A/HRC/52/CRP.4), 29 August 2023, para. 604, available at https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2023-08/A_HRC_52_CRP.4_En%20%28003%29.pdf.

129.  Ibid., para. 611.

130.  Ibid., para. 621; Insecurity Insight et al., 21 February 2023, supra note 42, at 51.

131.  ICTY, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, supra note 57, paras. 267, 272; Prosecutor v. Kunarać, supra note 14, paras. 766-774.

132.  ICTY, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, supra note 57, para. 272. 

133.  ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milan Simić, supra note 15, para. 63.

134.  C. Gall and O. Chubko, ‘Many Ukrainian Prisoners of War Show Signs of Trauma and Sexual Violence’, The New York Times, 28 April 2024, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/28/world/europe/russia-ukraine-prisoners-of-war-trauma-violence.html#:~:text=Ukraine's%20prosecutor%20general%2C%20Andriy%20Kostin,forms%20of%20ill%2Dtreatment.%E2%80%9D. 

135.  Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, ‘Conflict-Related Sexual Violence - Report of the Secretary-General’ (S/2024/292), 4 April 2024, para. 71. See also OHCHR, 24 March 2023, supra note 35, para. 62.

136.  Ibid.

137.  Interview with Ivan Karnaushenko by TV Zvezda on 30 July 2022, available at  https://t.me/zvezdanews/87999 and https://t.me/zvezdanews/87532. 

138.  Interview with Artem Zubov by TV Zvezda on 30 July 2022, available at https://t.me/zvezdanews/87534. 

139.  H. Bachega, ‘Ukrainian Prisoners of War Say They Were Tortured at Russian Prison’, BBC, 16 August 2023, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66453692.   

140.  ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, 5 March 2024, supra note 31, para. 65. See also H. Coynash, ‘Russia’s Killing of Over 50 Ukrainian PoWs at Olenivka Was a “Show Execution” – Former Azov Defender’, Human Rights in Ukraine (KHPG), 14 September 2023, available at https://khpg.org/en/1608812772 (in which a released PoW explains that the treatment meted out to Azov defenders was “three times worse” than that to other PoWs, and that Azov medics are treated even more savagely than that. According to him, this was due to the huge propaganda effort, with the Russian media talking about Azov around 60% of the time).

141.  B. Trew, 21 August 2022, supra note 40.

142.  OHCHR, 24 March 2023, supra note 35, para. 72.

143.  Ibid., para. 76.

144.  Human Rights Watch, 28 July 2023, supra note 77.

145.  OHCHR, 24 March 2023, supra note 35, para. 76.

146.  Ibid.

147.  A. Anastasia Tenisheva, 29 August 2022, supra note 44.

148.  Interview with Vasyl Lomakin by TV Zvezda on 30 July 2022, available at https://t.me/zvezdanews/87837. 

149.  Ibid. 

150.  Interview with Ivan Karnaushenko by TV Zvezda on 30 July 2022, available at https://t.me/zvezdanews/87999 and https://t.me/zvezdanews/87532. 

151.  Ibid.

152.  Ibid.

153.  Interview with Danylo Yan by TV Zvezda on 30 July 2022, available at https://t.me/zvezdanews/87849.  

154.  Interview with Oleg Demchuk by TV Zvezda on 30 July 2022, available at https://t.me/zvezdanews/87533. Note: This statement fits the Russian narrative that a HIMARS-missile was launched and hit Barrack 200. However, experts have agreed that, based on photographic and video evidence, the damage was done by a thermobaric weapon, meaning that the weapon exploded in the barrack and was not launched from outside and hitting the roof of the barrack; see OHCHR, ‘Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, 1 February 2023 - 31 July 2023’, 4 October 2023, at paras 10, 83, 84, available at https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/coiukraine/23-10-04-OHCHR-36th-periodic-report-ukraine-en.pdf. 

155.  Interview with Yehor Karnyushkin by TV Zvezda on 30 July 2022, available at https://t.me/zvezdanews/87881 (stating “I had a fountain of blood coming out of my chest at once.”).

156.  Interview with Oleg Abdyukov by TV Zvezda on 30 July 2022, available at https://t.me/zvezdanews/87994. 

157.  Interview with Serhii Alieksieievych by TV Zvezda on 30 July 2022, available at https://t.me/zvezdanews/88002. 

158.  Courier.Wednesday, ‘Interviews with Surviving Prisoners after the Attack on the Pre-Trial Detention Center in Yelenovka’, 30 July 2022 [VKontakte video], available at https://vk.com/video-28009645_456243013; Courier.Wednesday, ‘“Everything Began to Burn, I Felt A Lot of Pain”: The First Interview of Rescued "Azovtsy " After the Shelling of the Isolation Centre in Yelenovka. The Strike Could Have Been Carried Out by Kiev to "Shut the Mouths" of Its Fighters - Rudenko's Report’, 30 July 2022, available at https://kurer-sreda.ru/2022/07/30/vse-nachalo-goret-pochuvstvoval-silnuiu-bol-pervoe-interviu-spasennykh-azovtsev-posle-obstrela-po-izoliatoru-v-elenovke-udar-mog-nanesti-kiev-chtoby-zatknut-rty-svoim-boitsam-reportazh-rudenko.  

159.  OHCHR, 24 March 2023, supra note 35, para. 74; OHCHR, 4 October 2023, supra note 154, para. 88 (the OHCHR reports that “[s]tarting at 9:00 a.m. on 29 July, PoWs were ordered to remove debris and dead bodies from the barracks and to clear pieces of corrugated tin sheets which had been blown from the roof.”).

160.  Ibid; Interview with Danylo Yan by TV Zvezda on 30 July 2022, supra note 153.

161.  Compare Ivan Karnaushenko (“[we] started to provide each other with first aid”) and Oleg Demchuk (“[w]e ran out from the building, gathered around, estimated the situation, and started to provide people who were wounded heavily with aid.”) to Ivan Karnaushenko (“I was provided with first medical aid and then we were waiting for evacuation from the colony.”).  

162.  Art. 30 GC III.

163.  See Art. 33 GC III (which reads that “members of the medical personnel [...] while retained by the Detaining Power with a view to assisting prisoners of war, shall not be considered as prisoners of war.”).

164.  OHCHR, 24 March 2023, supra note 35, para. 76.

165.  Ibid.

166.  Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, 30 July 2022, available at t.me/mod_russia/18064 [Telegram post].

167.  Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, ‘List of Ukrainian Prisoners of War Killed As A Result of the Kiev Regime's Missile Attack on the Detention Centre Near the Locality of Yelenovka in the Donetsk People's Republic on 29 July 2022’, 30 July 2022, available at https://telegra.ph/Spisok-voennoplennyh-ukraincev-pogibshih-v-rezultate-raketnogo-udara-kievskogo-rezhima-po-sledstvennomu-izolyatoru-v-rajone-nase-07-30; Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, ‘List of Ukrainian Prisoners of War Wounded As A Result of the Kiev Regime's Missile Attack on the Detention Centre Near the Locality of Yelenovka in the Donetsk People's Republic on 29 July 2022’, 30 July 2022, available at https://telegra.ph/Spisok-voennoplennyh-ukraincev-ranenyh-v-rezultate-raketnogo-udara-kievskogo-rezhima-po-sledstvennomu-izolyatoru-v-rajone-nasele-07-30; A. Sheremet, ‘Terrorist Attack in Olenivka: Russia Published A List of Dead Prisoners of War. Ukraine Has Not Yet Received It’, Babel, 30 July 2022, available at https://babel.ua/en/news/82248-terrorist-attack-in-olenivka-russia-published-a-list-of-dead-prisoners-of-war-ukraine-has-not-yet-received-it. 

168.  Ibid.

169.  C. Gilbody Dickerson, ‘Ukraine War: How Wives of Imprisoned Azovstal Fighters Are Honouring Them’, SkyNews, 16 May 2024, available at https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-how-wives-of-imprisoned-azovstal-fighters-are-honouring-them-13136185. 

170.  A. Rokytna et al., ‘Taken to Execution By Lists - Terrorist Attack in Olenivka A Year after the Tragedy’, 29 July 2023, available at https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/analytics/taken-to-execution-by-lists-terrorist-attack-1690617327.html.

171.  See also Part I of OSINT FOR UKRAINE’s investigation, available at https://static1.squarespace.com/static/626ef32886867e5389251d32/t/65c0082d406aab28f5ec0743/1707085151892/Oleniivka+Part+I+-+Timeline.docx.pdf.

172.  Art. 121(1) GC III; Commentary of 2020 to GC III, para. 4661 (for an investigation to be effective, the Detaining Power must take appropriate steps, employing all feasible means to establish the circumstances and cause of a PoW’s death or injury).

173.  Ibid.

174.  Arts. 120 and 122 GC III. Note: In Ukraine, the National Information Bureau and the Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War are responsible for maintaining registers of prisoners of war. 

175.  Ibid., referring to Art. 17 GC III (explaining the particulars of identity that may be shown on an identity card furnished to prisoners of war: “surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or equivalent number.”).

176.  OHCHR, 4 October 2023, supra note 154, paras. 82, 87.

177.  Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, 29 July 2022, available at https://t.me/sledcom_press/2662 and https://t.me/sledcom_press/2664 [Telegram posts]. 

178.  Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, 5 August 2022, available at https://t.me/sledcom_press/2783 [Telegram post] and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=REQ2bOBazjk [YouTube video],   

179.  Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, ‘The Damage Will Be Counted to the Penny’, 8 August 2022, available at https://sledcom.ru/press/smi/item/1713488/?pdf=1/. 

180.  OHCHR, 26 March 2024, supra note 32, paras. 59-62;  Ukrainska Pravda, ‘Families of PoWs Killed and Wounded in Olenivka Prison Camp Have Three Requests for International Community’, 23 March 2024, available at https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/03/23/7447837/. 

181.  B.Trew, 21 August 2022, supra note 40.

182.  Ibid.

183.  ‘The Geneva Convention and the Right to Original Mail’, Justice Action, February 2024.

184.  Kosovo Specialist Chambers, Specialist Prosecutor v. Salih Mustafa, Further Redacted Version of Corrected Version of Public Redacted Version of Trial Judgement, Case No. KSC-BC-2020-05, 16 December, paras. 599-602.

185.  See also Ukrainska Pravda, ‘Red Cross to Ensure Ukrainian Prisoners of War Can Contact Their Families’, 15 November 2022, available at https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/11/15/7376474/. 

186.  Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, ‘In the Donetsk People's Republic, 10 Servicemen of the Nationalist Azov Regiment Were Sentenced’, 18 March 2024, available at  http://sledcom.ru/news/item/1869203/.

187.  Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, ‘In the Donetsk People's Republic, A Sentence Was Passed on Servicemen of the Nationalist Azov Regiment’, 6 December 2023, available at https://sledcom.ru/news/item/1844151/?pdf=1. 

188.  Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, ‘The DPR Sentenced Servicemen of the Azov Nationalist Regiment’, December 2023 [VKontakte video], available at https://vk.com/video-49878783_456250210. 

189.  Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, ‘Member of the Azov Regiment Convicted of Killing Two Civilians in Mariupol’, 11 September 2023, available at https://sledcom.ru/news/item/1823697/?pdf=1. 

190.  Main Military Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, ‘In the Donetsk People's Republic, Military Personnel of the Nationalist Azov Regiment Were Sentenced’, 14 November 2023, available at http://gvsu.gov.ru/news/v-done+tskoy-narodnoy-respublike-vyneseny-prigovory-voennosluzhashchim-natsionalisticheskogo-polka-az/?sphrase_id=82181.   

191.  Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, ‘Soldiers of the Azov regiment sentenced for crimes against civilians in Mariupol’, 21 August 2023, available at https://sledcom.ru/news/item/1818317/?pdf=1.  

192.  Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, ‘In the DPR, A Soldier of the Nationalist Azov Regiment Was Convicted of Killing A Civilian’, 22 November 2023, available at https://sledcom.ru/news/item/1840596/?pdf=1. 

193.  Arts. 99 and 105 GC III.

194.  Art. 8(2)(a)(vi) Rome Statute. 

195.  Arts. 85 and 108 GC III; Commentary of 2020 to GC III, para. 4197.

196.  Art. 108 GC III; Commentary of 2020 to GC III, para. 4201.

197.  Committee Against Torture, ‘Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of the Russian Federation, Adopted by the Committee at its Forty-Ninth Session (29 October-23 November 2012)’ (CAT/C/RUS/CO/5), 11 December 2012, paras. 6-10.