The Russian Red Cross: True Humanitarians or the Kremlin’s Accomplices?
Investigators: Vasile Popa and Vyacheslav Kolomets
Authors: Natalia Jasztal and Margot V.H.
Edited by: Emma Urbanova
Last year, the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) responded to allegations about the forcible deportation of Ukrainians to Russia by stating that “[t]he ICRC does not ever help organise or carry out forced evacuations” and that it is “aware of the allegations that have been published in the media of involuntary large-scale movements of people and continue to follow the issue closely”. [1] This was stated even before the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants in March 2023 and before the ICRC’s meetings with the Russian Red Cross society took place. With this legal analysis, we hope to give some insight into how these allegations came to be and what legal obligations the ICRC has to react to violations of the ICRC Statute by Red Cross Movements, like the Russian Red Cross society (“RKK”). In Part I of this analysis, some background information on the establishment of the RKK and how its missions are funded will be given. Secondly, the legal framework covering the legal status of National Red Cross societies, particularly the crime of forcible deportation, will be laid out. The third part of this analysis will delve into who are the main figures within the RKK and what kind of assistance has the RKK been offering since the start of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict. Based on these facts, we will analyse the ways in which the RKK might have breached the ICRC Statute and the avenues that exist to react to violations committed by National Red Cross Societies.
Background
The Russian Red Cross, established in 1867, is one of the oldest non-governmental organisations in Russia and was recognised as such by the ICRC in 1921. [2] The governing board of the RKK is composed of 39 people, electing its own chairperson and meeting once a year. [3] Every five years, the general assembly of the RKK meets and elects a governing board. Currently, there are 84 RKK branches covering almost all regions of the Russian Federation. [4] Although the 2023-2026 plan has not officially been published yet, the main areas of work of the RKK are in “emergencies, health and social programmes”. [5] The RKK’s missions are further reflected in its statutes which are based on the Fundamental Principles of the Movement. As of 2022, the RKK is the main coordinator of humanitarian support provided to people who have left Ukraine and are currently on Russian territory. [6]
On the list of countries receiving international funding from the Red Cross movement, Russia was in eighth place, having received 16.5 CHF for humanitarian relief in 2022. [7] The main National Society donors were the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (“IFRC”), Norwegian Red Cross, Austrian Red Cross, and the ICRC. [8] Russia’s IFRC Response Plan of 2022 shows that zero migrants were given assistance, but that the RKK mostly focused on assisting people within Russia with Cash and Voucher Assistance (“CVA”), relief, and shelter. [9] The chairman of the RKK, however, claims that the RKK received 260 million rubles from the ICRC and Red Crescent Movement which is nowhere near the 1.5 billion rubles the RKK would have received in 2022 according to data from the IFRC. Furthermore, the RKK claims not to use public funds, because they “do not want to be a burden on the state”. [10] Despite this claim, the RKK published an article congratulating seven RKK branches who were among the winners of the 12th competition of Presidential Grants Funds and received 24 million rubles for the implementation of projects. [11] Of course, the funds were “won” rather than given, but these contradictory claims raise doubts about the transparency of the RKK when it comes to funding and how they spend this money. To gain a better understanding of why the lack of transparency might be a problem, we first need to lay down the legal framework concerning co-perpetrators and indirect perpetrators, and the framework within which the RKK conducts its work.
Legal Framework
Warrants issued by the International Criminal Court
Although Ukraine is not a State Party to the Rome Statute, in accordance with article 12(3) of the Statute which allows non-State parties to grant the ICC jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis, Ukraine has accepted ICC jurisdiction regarding crimes committed on Ukrainian territory. In March 2022, the ICC Prosecutor officially announced that he had opened an investigation regarding the situation in Ukraine. The scope of the investigation is focused on “past and present allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide committed on any part of the territory of Ukraine by any person from November 2013 onwards”. [12] Finally, on 17 March 2023, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II issued arrest warrants for Mr. Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, the President of the Russian Federation, and Ms. Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, Commissioner for Children’s Rights in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation. It is important to mention that in order to issue a warrant by the ICC, the judges must be satisfied that there are “reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC”. [13]
Mr. Putin is “allegedly responsible for the war crime of unlawful deportation of population (children) and of unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation (under articles 8(2)(a)(vii) and 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute). The crimes were allegedly committed in occupied Ukrainian territory at least from 24 February 2022. There are reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Putin bears individual criminal responsibility for the aforementioned crimes, (i) for having committed the acts directly, jointly with others and/or through others (article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute), and (ii) for his failure to exercise control properly over civilian and military subordinates who committed the acts, or allowed for their commission, and who were under his effective authority and control, pursuant to superior responsibility (article 28(b) of the Rome Statute).” Ms. Lvova-Belova is allegedly responsible for the same war crime of unlawful transfer of population, “for having committed the acts directly, jointly with others and/or through others” (article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute). [14]
The above-mentioned crimes – unlawful deportation of population (children) and unlawful transfer of population (children) – fall within the category of war crimes, as well as crimes against humanity. War crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide are collectively named as international crimes – the most extreme and serious violations of international law. According to article 7(2d) of the Rome Statute, “deportation or forcible transfer of population” means forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law. [15] The elements of this crime have changed over time. For example, the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia found several defendants guilty of deportation and inhumane acts (forcible transfer) as crimes against humanity. In Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić [16], it was stated that:
“The elements of deportation and forcible transfer are substantially similar. Deportation and forcible transfer are defined as: (i) the forced displacement of one or more persons by expulsion or other forms of coercion, (ii) from an area in which they are lawfully present, (iii) without grounds permitted under international law. There is an important distinction between the two crimes; for deportation, the displacement of persons must be across a de jure border between two states or, in certain circumstances, a de facto border, and for forcible transfer, the removal may take place within national boundaries.
489. To establish deportation and forcible transfer, there must be a forced displacement of persons carried out by expulsion or other forms of coercion. The term “forced” may include physical force, as well as the threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression, or abuse of power, or the act of taking advantage of a coercive environment. The forced character of the displacement is determined by the absence of genuine choice by the victim in his or her displacement. As such, while persons may consent to, or even request, their removal, any consent or request to be displaced must be given voluntarily and as a result of the individual’s free will, assessed in light of the surrounding circumstances of the particular case.”
490. Furthermore, the involvement of a non-governmental organisation in facilitating displacements does not in and of itself render lawful an otherwise unlawful transfer. An agreement among military commanders, political leaders, or other representatives of the parties in a conflict cannot make a displacement lawful either; it is the consent of the individual that determines whether a displacement is voluntary.”
The crime of forcible deportation is also considered a crime under international humanitarian law, since its goal is the protection of migrants, including those in armed conflicts. By the end of 2015, the number of refugees, asylum-seekers and internally displaced persons that had been forcibly displaced worldwide due to armed conflicts, other situations of violence, persecution or human rights violations reached an unprecedented 65.3 million [17], which shows the importance of international human rights and international humanitarian regulations as well as the significance of organisations responsible for its protection. According to the Geneva Conventions (“GC”), all migrants are protected against the effects of hostilities and must be treated humanely under the general rules covering the civilian population. When considered protected persons, all migrants, including refugees and stateless persons, are also entitled to the full spectrum of protection provided by GC IV relative to the protection of civilians. Finally, persons who are considered “refugees” under GC IV benefit from specific protection under Article 44 of GC IV when in the territory of a party to the conflict or Article 70(2) of GC IV when in territory occupied by their country of origin. [18] Article 24 of said Convention highlights the importance of child welfare and measures aiming to protect children in armed conflicts. These provisions were approved by the XVIIth International Red Cross Conference in 1948, immediately after the Second World War – when the International Committee of the Red Cross was associated, as far as its resources allowed, with the highly praiseworthy efforts made to reunite children and parents who had lost contact with each other.
As was mentioned in the warrants, those acts might have been committed directly, jointly with others and/or through others pursuant to article 25(3) of the Roman Statute. [19] This subparagraph distinguishes between three forms of perpetration: direct or immediate perpetration (“as an individual”), co-perpetration (“jointly with another”) and perpetration by means (“through another person”). [20] All these forms are collectively described as ‘principal liability’. “According to the case law of the court perpetration within the meaning of article 23 (3)(a) covers three categories of offenders: those who physically commit the crime (commission of the crime in person or direct perpetration); those who control the will of the physical perpetrators (commission through another person or indirect perpetration); and those who control the offence because of essential tasks assigned to them (commission of the crime jointly, or co-perpetration).”
A situation envisioned under the concept of indirect perpetration is often associated with having “perpetrator behind the perpetrator”, where one person is being exploited by another, while nevertheless remaining responsible. Such thesis has been stated by the Appeals Chamber in the Lubanga case as “being based on the notion that a person can commit a crime ‘through another person’. The underlying assumption is that the accused makes use of another person, who actually carries out the incriminated conduct, by virtue of the accused's control over that person, and the latter's conduct is therefore imputed on the former.” [21]
“The concept of co-perpetration is originally rooted in the idea that when the sum of co-ordinated individual contributions of a plurality of persons results in the realisation of all the objective elements of a crime, any person making contribution can be held vicariously responsible for the contributions of all the others and, as a result can be considered a principal to the whole crime.” [22] Pre-Trial Chamber III stated that criminal responsibility under the concept of co-perpetration requires proof of the following two elements: 1) the suspect must be part of a common plan or agreement with one or more persons and 2) the suspect and the other co-perpetrator must carry out essential contributions in a coordinated manner which result in the fulfilment of the material elements of the crime.” [23]
Nevertheless, “[p]rincipals to a crime are not limited to those who physically carry out the objective elements of the offence, but also include those who, in spite of being removed from the scene of the crime, control or mastermind its commission, because they decide whether and how the offence will be committed.” [24]
The objective elements of liability based on Joint Criminal Enterprise are threefold: “a plurality of persons; the existence of a common plan, design, or purpose; and the participation of the accused in the JCE by any ‘form of assistance in, or contribution to, the execution of the common purpose’. While the objective requirements apply equally to all three categories, the subjective requirements vary with each category: JCE I requires the shared intent of the co-perpetrators; JCE II demands the perpetrator’s personal knowledge of the system of ill-treatment and JCE III requires the perpetrator’s intention (i) to participate in the criminal purpose and further this purpose and (ii) to contribute to the commission of a crime by the group. Responsibility for a crime that was not part of the common purpose arises if the commission of this crime was foreseeable and the accused (willingly) took that risk.” [25] Based on the explanation, all the individuals participating in the forcible deportation of people – even in varying degrees – shall be held responsible, according to article 25 of Rome Statute.
It is doubtful that Putin and/or Lvova-Belova have directly committed international crimes themselves, and according to the above-mentioned explanation, they do not even have to be present at a crime scene to become perpetrators of international crimes. The warrants issued against them by the ICC suggest that international law violations could have been committed by them directly, jointly with others and/or through others. Committing a crime through another perpetrator or through co-perpetration can mean that both ‘principal perpetrator’ and other individuals contributing to committing the crime can be held responsible for these violations of international humanitarian law. In that case, who else, alongside Putin and Lvova-Belova, might have participated in unlawful deportations of people? Since there is most probably a third party involved in this crime contribution, is it possible that a member of the Russian Red Cross – an organisation that is closely related to the government and has been present at locations where alleged violations took place – can be uncovered as a perpetrator of international crimes?
International Committee of Red Cross and Russian Red Cross
After the publication of the earlier-mentioned warrants, the International Committee of the Red Cross stated they had been in contact with “a Russian official suspected of war crimes as it works for the return of Ukrainian children who were deported to Russia.” [26] The spokesman for the ICRC, Jason Straziuso, said the ICRC stays in touch with Maria Lvova-Belova “in line with its mandate to restore contact between separated families and facilitate reunification where feasible”. [27] CNBC deems it “beyond the engagement of other agencies”, as, for example, UNICEF has also tried to contact the Russian officials – but unfortunately, without success, since it “has not received feedback on [their] offer to facilitate reunification processes”. [28] It therefore seems like the International Committee of Red Cross has been treated differently regarding this matter. This raises the question: is there a reason for the Russian Federation to prioritise contact with the ICRC as an organisation over contact with other agencies working towards similar goals?
The International Committee of the Red Cross is an organisation that focuses on ensuring humanitarian protection and assistance for victims of war and other situations of violence. The Preamble of the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement [29] states that “the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies together constitute a worldwide humanitarian movement, whose mission is to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found, to protect life and health and ensure respect for the human being, in particular in times of armed conflict and other emergencies, to work for the prevention of disease and for the promotion of health and social welfare, to encourage voluntary service and a constant readiness to give help by the members of the Movement, and a universal sense of solidarity towards all those in need of its protection and assistance”. The Preamble also mentions that the Movement shall follow those 7 principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality. Article 1(2) continues this narrative by stating that “the components of the Movement, while maintaining their independence within the limits- of the present Statutes, act at all times in accordance with the Fundamental Principles and cooperate with each other in carrying out their respective tasks in pursuance of their common mission,” as well as article 2(3) which reads that “the States shall at all times respect the adherence by all the components of the Movement to the Fundamental Principles.”
Arguably, we can observe the importance of the earlier mentioned 7 principles which should be followed by the Movement: “In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature. [...] The Movement is independent. The National Societies, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of their respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able at all times to act in accordance with the principles of the Movement.”
On the other hand, the ICRC Statute mentions in articles 3(1) and 3(2) that “[the National Societies] carry out their humanitarian activities in conformity with their own statutes and national legislation, in pursuance of the mission of the Movement, and in accordance with the Fundamental Principles. The National Societies support the public authorities in their humanitarian tasks, according to the needs of the people of their respective countries. [...] They disseminate and assist their governments in disseminating international humanitarian law; they take initiatives in this respect. They disseminate the principles and ideals of the Movement and assist those governments which also disseminate them. They also cooperate with their governments to ensure respect for international humanitarian law and to protect the distinctive emblems recognized by the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols”. This is recognised by the Russian Federation in Article 5 of the Russian Federal Law pertaining to legal status and role of the RKK which reads that:
“In both peacetime and wartime, the activities of the Russian Red Cross (RRC) extend throughout the territory of the Russian Federation and are carried out in strict compliance with Russian legislation, the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, international treaties of which the Russian Federation is a party, [...] the Charter, as well as the Statutes and Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The state authorities of the Russian Federation, under any circumstances, recognize and respect the RRC's commitment to the Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and the voluntary and independent nature derived from these Principles, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55(I).”
The Fundamental Principles, which are referred to in Article 5, read that the National Societies shall always be neutral, independent, and maintain their autonomy. The Russian Federal law also includes these principles; humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, and voluntary service. At the same time, in various articles of the ICRC Statute, the importance of cooperation with the public authorities and government has been similarly identified. Both perspectives seem understandable – maintaining neutrality and independence is crucial in order for the Movement to actually focus on their goals and values. Cooperation with government and public officials – in commonplace, regular circumstances – may also be beneficial, as it could improve the efforts towards a shared goal. The National Societies’ cooperation with the government while maintaining neutrality and independence is fully possible in regular circumstances. But what happens when the National Red Cross cooperates so closely with the government and country’s public officials to the point where it no longer holds any actual independence? What happens when a particular country is involved in an armed conflict, and it turns out that so are the members of the National Red Cross? Can their actions still serve the ICRC’s purpose if there is no neutral and independent factor to it? Or even worse – can a national government use organisations like the Red Cross Movement to carry out acts in furtherance of their own policies, or perhaps even use humanitarian organisations to commit acts violating international principles of humanitarian law?
Analysis
Political influence and business interests of RKK members
There are indications suggesting that central figures within the RKK and some of the branches of the RKK either work closely together with the Russian government or have ties to influential political figures. [30] These people might be the principal perpetrators, used by Mr. Putin, to commit acts of, among other things, forcible deportation, or at least aid and abet in the commission of international crimes.
Board of the RKK
The first and foremost example of this is the chairman of the Russian Red Cross, Pavel Savchuk, who has been a member of multiple governmental organisations, including the “Popular Front” which is a pro-Putin umbrella organisation, the Central Headquarters of the All-Russian People’s Front, and the Public Council of the RF Presidential Commissioner for Children. After the former chairman of the RKK, Raisa Lukuttsova, was charged with fraud, Savchuk was appointed as the new executive director in April 2021. [31] As chairman of the RKK, Savchuk co-organised the Russian campaign, #WeTogether (#WeVmeste), with the All-Russian People’s Front, which consists of a variety of different “missions” focused on providing humanitarian aid, medical care, and education. For instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic a #WeTogether campaign was started to help increase the vaccination rate and provide help to the elderly and people with limited mobility. [32] Another ongoing #WeTogether campaign, which started last year, is focused on providing humanitarian aid to internally displaced persons (“IDPs”) from Donbass. [33] In an interview, Savchuk commented that the RKK has acted as the chief coordinator of humanitarian assistance throughout the country since the start of the “Ukrainian crisis” on 24 February 2022. [34] According to Savchuk, the RKK’s assistance has been “downplayed” a lot at the international level and he reiterated that the RKK abides to the ICRC’s fundamental principles which helps the RKK not to take any political side. [35] He also noted that the State has an obligation to respect the ICRC’s and RKK’s principles through legislation. Savchuk has been put on the Ukrainian sanction list for “spreading Kremlin propaganda narratives to justify Russia's actions that undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as its stability and security”.
During a congress held on 23 April 2021, the Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Health, Oleg Salagai, spoke about the joint work the Ministry and RKK planned on carrying out. Last year, once more, a congress on the Red Cross’s work for the #WeTogether campaign was held. The congress was attended by the President of the ICRC, Francesco Rocca, and virtually attended by Putin via a video-conference call during which Putin expressed his support for the new law concerning the Russian Red Cross. These meetings, as well as previously mentioned government-sourced fundings and political engagement of the RKK’s chairman indicate a close relationship between the RKK and the Russian government, which would be directly against the ICRC Statute and some of its main principles - neutrality, impartiality, and independence. The facts that there has been an ICC warrant issued against Putin regarding unlawful deportation of people, and that RKK has helped provide “humanitarian aid to internally displaced persons” might serve as proof that the actions of those two parties might be connected, especially considering that there has been a positive relationship between them. If RKK board members have participated in forcible deportation of people, based on Article 25 of Rome Statute, they can therefore be held responsible as well. However, it is more likely that they are considered members of a Russian “joint criminal enterprise”, meaning that their conduct will be attributed to higher-ups prosecuted by the ICC or a future international ad hoc tribunal.
RKK Branches
Some of the RKK branches and its members are very active on social media, sharing their ongoing projects and their work with the world. Whereas some posts exhibit typical online behaviour you would expect from a humanitarian organisation, other posts raise doubts as to the alleged neutrality and independence of the RKK’s branches and its members. For instance, the St. Petersburg branch participated in a #WeTogether campaign by teaching volunteers first aid skills and sending those volunteers to mass events, currently being the biggest organisation in the city to provide humanitarian aid to refugees from Donbass. Several RKK branches are also actively and openly aiding armed forces and have expressed their support for the “Special Operation”. Meanwhile, these branches also provide humanitarian aid to refugees from Ukrainian territory. Another branch in Angarsk has been openly supporting the “Special Operation Z” on Telegram by posting pictures of them providing soldiers with uniforms, cleaning products, food, and games. [36] Again, branches supporting the Russian “Special Operation” indicate a violation of the ICRC’s Statute, namely the principles of neutrality and impartiality.
Politicians who are active within the RKK
It is publicly known that Kostel Olga Nikolaevna is a member of the ruling United Russia party, while also holding a post on the Youth Affairs Council of the RKK’s branch in the Arkhangelsk Region. That is, she is a politician who at the same time holds the post of head of a branch in an organisation that describes itself as “independent” and “not regulated by the state”. The fact that RKK board members are also important members of the ruling party in Russia reflects negatively on the independence and autonomy of the RKK.
Violations of the ICRC Statute
In November 2022, a delegation of the IFRC visited the temporary accommodation centre in the Kaluga region. The vice-Secretary General of the IFRC, Xavier Castellanos, remarked: “With winter already well on its way, the humanitarian needs are growing, and I know the Russian Red Cross will be there to support the people who need it”. [37] Statements like this give the impression that the ICRC, as suggested in the introduction, and the IFRC, fully support the RKK’s work and have no doubts about its “dignity” and “neutrality”. However, outsiders have similarly noted the close relationship between the Kremlin and the RKK. An independent volunteer from Tver, Valentina, stated: “Once, other volunteers and I helped Ukrainians sort out the humanitarian aid they received from the Red Cross. Among the things we found [were] mugs with Putin[‘s image], T-shirts with him and with the letter Z [on it].” To Valentina, it seemed “cruel and unethical” to give refugees items with the symbol of the “Special Operation” because of which they had lost their homes. [38] Valentina, like other independent volunteers, also encountered difficulties helping refugees because of interference from the government. According to the media platform Lay-Out, “Russian authorities have been making attempts to close access to refugees since the beginning of the war. Free help to Ukrainians in Russia is possible only through official organisations, including, for example, United Russia youth movements, regional dioceses, as well as the “We Together”-project, launched during the Coronavirus lockdown by the All-Russian Popular Front, the Medical Volunteers and the Association of Volunteer Centers.” Access to temporary accommodation centres (“TAC”) was only possible through the Russian Red Cross who were working together with these centres. Considering that the article about the IFRC delegation visiting a TAC was written by the RKK itself, it is difficult to say if the IFRC is aware of Ukrainian refugees receiving those products with Putin’s image on it, and if the IFRC talked to any of the refugees there.
Additionally, both Putin and Lvova-Belova believe that the Donbass, Luhansk, and Donetsk territories are not occupied, but already annexed, which implies that they believe themselves to have been engaging in the ‘evacuation’ of children rather than the forcible deportation of people. [39] From an international law perspective, however, the three territories are occupied territory belonging to Ukraine. From VKontakte and Telegram posts of several RKK branches, it becomes apparent that they support Putin and Lvova-Belova’s perspective. For example, in several posts and articles, the RKK is speaking of “IDPs”, which stands for internally displaced persons. [40] There is an integral difference between IDPs – displaced persons moving within one country, and refugees – displaced persons moving from one country to another. This semantic difference demonstrates how the RKK considers persons from Donbass and Luhansk to be IDPs from annexed territory instead of refugees travelling from Ukrainian territory to Russian territory. Moreover, Maria Lvova-Belova herself asked Russians: “Isn’t it a patriotic feeling when there [are] no people’s children and all of them are ours?” The use of “ours” implies that the children once belonged to another group of people but have become Russian after the annexation of Ukrainian territory. She repeated this view in an interview with Vice stating that “these are children from those regions that have recognised themselves as Russia[n] … These are Russian-speaking children, these are children and parents who have expressed a desire to become one big Russia.” [41] As it is highlighted in another OSINT for Ukraine legal analysis, the RKK has monopoly over the TACs and has accommodated, as confirmed by Savchuk himself, between 4,000 and 5,000 children across several TACs in Russia. Although Savchuk did not make a similar comment as Lvova-Belova did about the children being “Russian children”, the article does speak of children who had to ‘evacuate’ to Russia, and he identifies the children as IDPs rather than refugees. Therefore, one can reasonably assume that the RKK supports these views and “knowingly” aids and abets in the forcible deportation of children. If our suspicions are true, the actions of the RKK, by participating in the forcible deportation of children, can be attributed to Putin and Lvova-Belova pursuant to article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute on individual responsibility. Such acts could amount to a violation of article 7(2d) of the Rome Statute on the “deportation or forcible transfer of population”. This depends on the arrests of Putin and Lvova-Belova, but if they are ever arrested and prosecuted, the Prosecution could argue that Putin committed the crime through another person, such as a RKK member. The RKK member would be the principal perpetrator, and Putin the indirect perpetrator. The above-mentioned acts of the RKK also indicate breaches of Geneva Convention (IV), based on which the ICRC performs its work.
Not to mention that the actions mentioned in this paragraph show a lack of any neutrality, impartiality, or independence that National Societies should possess according to the ICRC’s Statute and principles.
An even clearer example of the RKK breaching ICRC principles would be their alleged support of the Russian military. Ukrainian news outlets claim that the RKK raising funds to support the families of Russian military personnel as of October 2022 is in violation of the ICRC Statute. [42] Moreover, as part of a #WeTogether project, volunteers are asked to collect military equipment like uniforms and drones, a claim that has been dismissed by the RKK as false. [43] However, the Ukrainian news outlet 24TV, upon a telephone call with the Kamchatka RKK branch, confirmed that some RKK branches indeed have volunteers collect military equipment. [44] As previously highlighted, RKK personnel working for the Angarsk and Kirov branches have expressed support for the “Special Operation”. For instance, the previous head of the Kirov branch, Yuri Basmanov, was simultaneously a member of the RKK as well as the Combat Brotherhood and the Union of Donbass Volunteer Organisations which supports militants of the DPR. [45] Another Ukrainian news outlet, Telegraf, points out that Savchuk, the head of the RKK, was the organiser of the Medical Volunteer Movement, which receives direct funding from the Russian government and trains volunteers to provide medical services to the Russian Army. [46] However, Article 12(2) of GC I declares that “members of armed forces who are wounded or sick shall be cared for by the Party to the conflict in whose power they may be”, so RKK members are expected to treat wounds of any Russian or Ukrainian soldier they encounter. This action in itself is therefore not contrary to the Geneva Conventions and the ICRC Statute.
A promotional poster for a children’s #WeTogether campaign shows a drawing of a soldier with a Z and Russian flag on the uniform, standing in front of a Russian flag while holding a child. On the flag, it is written: “Victory will be ours”, “zov” and “We are together”. However, the RKK claims that it only transfers funds to #WeTogether and does not have any influence over how these funds are then used. [47] Nevertheless, the RKK has not actively taken a stance against this campaign or distanced itself from the slogans on this poster.
The above-mentioned examples show how the RKK has not always acted in accordance with the seven core principles of the Red Cross movement. Although the RKK is primarily subject to Russian legislation and therefore must cooperate with the Russian government, its open support for the “Special Operation” and the Russian government’s actions regarding the forcible deportation of children brings the RKK’s neutrality into question. Hence, a comparison can be drawn between the actions of the German and Japanese Red Cross Societies between 1933 and 1945 and the current situation: The Japanese Red Cross had been completely nationalised when it followed the Japanese military into China in the 1930s, but, at that time, the ICRC was more focused on providing assistance to European countries and largely ignored the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. The ICRC did attempt to contact the German Red Cross to discuss the concentration camps in 1933, but this led to nothing. [48] Forsythe explains how the ICRC never considered ‘derecognition’ of the German Red Cross, as such an approach would jeopardise ICRC activities that were allowed on Nazi territory, and instead chose to deal with the Nazi government directly, which turned out to be a slightly more successful endeavour. [49] Thus, these two national branches of the Red Cross never faced consequences for violating the ICRC’s principles of impartiality and neutrality, which highlights how “fanatical patriotism [may] trump[...] global humanitarianism”. [50] Considering the ICRC’s historical approach to illegal conduct of its National Society branches during conflict, it is very likely that the ICRC will once more choose cooperation with the RKK over derecognition or confrontation. This approach would also be very much in line with its core principles by remaining impartial and focusing on providing humanitarian assistance to victims on both sides of the conflict. Internally, RKK members will therefore most likely not face any consequences. However, this is not to say that (board) members of the RKK cannot be held responsible at all. As explained before, RKK members may have acted as principal and/or indirect perpetrators of war crimes, and if, or when, the ICC succeeds in arresting Putin or his accomplices, the ICC can attribute crimes committed by RKK members to the “big fish”, considering the evidence of the tight relationship between the RKK and the Russian government. Other avenues include domestic prosecution by either Russian or Ukrainian courts, or prosecution by an ad hoc or special international criminal tribunal tasked with prosecuting war crimes and crimes of aggression once established.
Conclusion
With this analysis, we have attempted to shine a light on the dubious actions of the RKK, which go against the core principles of the Red Cross movement. From monopolising access to the TACs and openly supporting the “Special Operation” on social media to collecting military equipment for the Russian army, it is difficult to maintain the stance that the RKK is an independent and impartial humanitarian organisation. RKK members are at the same time members of patriotic political organisations and have ties to important people in the Russian government, which shows how, akin to the German and Japanese Red Cross Societies during the Second World War, the RKK has arguably chosen patriotism over humanitarianism. In this respect, the way the ICRC organisation is structured hinders it from directly addressing alleged violations of IHL that have been committed by its very own National Red Cross movement. As no internal ICRC mechanism exists to hold RKK members accountable and considering the ICRC’s historic approach in ignoring crimes committed by National Societies, time will show how the ICRC will deal with this issue. If not the ICRC or IFRC, the international community has options to prosecute individuals that have been linked to the RKK. Because now, unlike in the 1930s and 1940s, the whole world can look at evidence of RKK members acting as accomplices to the aggressor.
Author Biograpgies:
Vasile Popa is a Software Engineer and and OSINT specialist with a Bachelor degree in Computer Science. Original from Moldova, he is active in promoting IT and OSINT as tool s or the civil society to fight corruption and human right abuse, especially those committed by the russian army in Ukraine. At OSINT FOR UKRAINE he focuses on research and investigations, as well as on developing the software that we use in our work.
Vyacheslav is a Lead Investigator and OSINT specialist. He is actively engaged in advocating the use of OSINT and investigative techniques to combat corruption and human rights abuses, particularly those perpetrated by armed forces in conflict regions. Vyacheslav's dedication to justice and his passion for IT and OSINT led him to pursue a career in investigative work.
Natalia Jasztal is Master of Laws graduate with background in international criminal law and transnational criminal law. At OSINT FOR UKRAINE she focuses on using her educational expertise in relation to international crime violations committed on the territory of Ukraine.
MVH has a background in public international law and criminology, with a focus on victimology and conflict-related sexual violence. As legal analyst their aim is to explain the legal concepts in layman terms in order for the public to better understand what crimes are being committed on Ukrainian territory
